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The purpose of this thesis is to explore the economic dimension of transnational engagement of the Somali diaspora 
living in Finland.  It is suggested that the social aspect of transnational economic engagement constitutes a major 
force in creating and reproducing remittance practices as well as the internal diaspora structures. Another objective 
of this study was to show how the theory of social capital can be effectively utilized in the studies of transnational 
economic activities. Accordingly, the view of remittances as an act of investment in social networks, which, as a 
value-laden action, facilitates the perpetual process of social capital (re)production is proposed. It is further argued 
that social class should be considered in conjunction with gender and ethnicity as factors that lie at the centre of the 
cycle of capital reproduction.  
The empirical data was collected by means of semi-structured interviews. The target group can be 
described as educated and well integrated into the Finnish labour market Somalis that are living in Helsinki and its 
surrounding areas. With the purpose of enhancing the empirical analysis, two expert interviews were conducted. 
Both information in printed and online media and the snowballing method were used in order to draw the participants 
for this study. 
The research findings revealed how transnational diaspora ties are articulated and enacted in the 
view of social capital (re)production and remittance practices. The politicized issue of transnational diasporic 
activities constitute one of the dimensions that shape the way how the subjects in this research relate to diasporic 
social networks. The perceived dominant role of Somali women in managing transnational support systems called 
attention to the gendered aspect of social capital. Interestingly, the widespread perception of the scale of women’s 
participation in remittance practices runs contrary to the existing statistics. Another crucial observation was that not 
all social ties are ‘mobilisable’, or can be draw upon at any time.  In conclusion, it is advocated that more in-depth 
research on the gender aspect of remittance practices as well as on the nature of the differences between refugee 
and labour remittances, particularly in terms of social relations that determine them, could significantly enhance the 
understanding of the topic in question. 
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Preface 
 
My academic research on diaspora remittances began with my keen interest in the 
multicultural societies of Nordic countries. Not until I arrived to Finland for the second 
year of my Master’s programme did I realize how eclectic in terms of ethnic 
communities Finland might be. Finnish ‘old’ and ‘new’ minorities form an integral part 
of the society. For that reason, I consider transnational economic engagement of the 
Somali diaspora, which happens to be the main subject in my study, as one of the 
features that define the contemporary culture and society in Finland.       
The question of why, after the long process of deliberation, my choice 
ultimately fell on Somali diaspora in Finland is rather easy to answer. Since I decided to 
approach the topic of transnational economic activities from the perspective of 
remittance practices and their embeddedness in ethnic social networks, Somalis 
appeared as a perfect study group.  There are several reasons for this. Firstly, 
remittances to Somalia have been a subject of continuous interest on the part of 
academics and international bodies alike due to their unprecedented scale and keen 
interest  that  the  global  Somali  diaspora  seems  to  take  in  its  homeland’s  affairs.  
Therefore, I was able to tap into a diverse array of sources for the purpose of my own 
research. Secondly, extensive and tightly-knit social networks that form the global 
Somali diaspora presented an opportunity to research social relations underlying 
remittances, which constitute the main focus of this thesis. Lastly, Somali community is 
the largest ethnic community coming from Africa and living in Finland – a fact that 
explains the high visibility of Somalis in urban public space as well as in the in public 
discourses around immigration and multiculturalism.    
In view of the foregoing, by means of this research, I was able to combine 
my interests in Finnish multicultural society, refugee remittances, and diaspora studies.  
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Introduction 
 
International migration produces a substantial flow of remittances between countries 
invisibly connected by immigrant networks. In 2006 the total amount of globally 
transmitted formal remittances was estimated to be three hundred billion US dollars 
(Vertovec, 2009 p. 105). By adding to that the approximation of unofficially transferred 
payments the total figure would increase by further billions of dollars. In Somalia 
remittances constitute the greatest share of capital inflow, which surpasses the amount 
of foreign direct investment, trade, and international development assistance (Hammond, 
2010).  Relatives and kin members that are divided in geographical terms stay 
nevertheless connected to each other by the means of transnational practices.  Financial 
support that comes from those living abroad serves many other purposes apart from just 
being means of subsistence for families and individuals struggling for survival.   
More  than  just  money,  remittances  play  an  immense  role  in  the  
transformation  of  societies  on  the  recipients’  end  as  well  as  shaping  the  lifestyle  and  
wellbeing of immigrant communities on the opposite end of the remittance pipeline. 
The sheer scope of international money transfers draws the attention of authorities and 
international organizations, which directly acknowledge the potential of remittances in 
developing local economies. Armed with the available statistics, scholars attempt to 
measure and predict causal relationships around the duo of migration and development. 
In other words, the effect of remittances on individual households and even national 
economies is getting an ever increasing attention.  Pushed to the sidelines as less visible 
and less subject to quantitative measurement, however, one can observe social relations 
that define, change, and reproduce the patterns of remittances.  
The focus on migrant remittances as economic transactions, seen in the 
light of its benefits for economic development and income smoothing for households in 
developing countries, dominates the literature. Per contra, social relations underlying 
remittance practices receive less attention. The act of sending money home conveys a 
diverse palette of meanings for individual senders as well as immigrant communities at 
large, which influence the power play among contending forces in the diaspora and has 
profound effects on daily decisions that individual remitters take. Areas such as the 
intricate interplay of personal choices, freedoms and obligations, changing gender 
relations (as exemplified by the traditional role of male bread-winner being challenged), 
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conflicting claims of societies at  home and abroad, to name just  a few, deserve further 
investigation.   
Migrants do not live their lives completely isolated from the diaspora.  As 
argued by Anne Lindley (2007), knowledge on remittances seen from the diaporic 
perspective is rather limited. However, this information is crucial for understanding 
remittance dynamics and its effects on the daily experiences of immigrants, their 
structural and socio-cultural integration, and general well-being. Moreover, diaspora 
understood as a decision-maker, whose members jointly or/and individually decide on 
the  direction  and  volume  of  remittance  flows,  is  rooted  in  a  complex  net  of  social  
relations. Understanding the way how relations in the diaspora are interpreted and 
enacted by its members would be a major step forward towards a better comprehension 
of its transnational economic activities. I will clarify what I mean by the concept of 
diaspora, and diasporic perspective as a way of looking at remittance practices in 
Chapter 2.   
Another point that deserves considerably more attention from the 
community of scholars on international migration is how a refugee background 
conflates with remittance practices. The nature of transnational economic activities 
articulated by refugees might vary from those of labour migrants. Individual 
experiences and meaning that it bears for refugees might also be quite dissimilar. A 
qualitative inquiry into this scarcely researched field might shed some light onto what it 
holds for a person with a refugee background to be a remitter and how it resonates with 
his or her daily life in the country of immigration. In my study I  will  focus on Somali  
refugees  or,  to  be  more  precise,  on  the  Somali  diaspora  in  the  context  of  the  
contemporary Finnish society. 
Remittance relationships may represent different forms and levels of 
commitment among individual or group remitters and receivers on the other end of the 
remittance pipeline.  In my research I endeavour to explore these complex relationships 
by arguing that all remittance relationships are embedded into complex migrant 
networks.  Seen in that light, the act of sending money entails engaging directly or 
indirectly with the entire network, reinforcing it, and reproducing its norms. That is to 
say that the significance of migrant networks that affect the dynamics of remittances 
and the day-to-day experiences of migrants themselves should not be underplayed. In 
the following chapter I will argue that the theory of social capital, which was originally 
10 
 
 
 
introduced by Pierre Bourdieu (1986), can serve as a very useful methodological tool in 
understanding remittance practices and the corresponding social relations.  
 
CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.1. Positioning in the Research and Research Questions 
1.1.1. Economic, cultural and social capital 
 
Social capital is a capital captured in social relations. Originally introduced by Bourdieu 
(1986), social capital is believed to be contingent on group membership and mutual 
recognition of its symbolic value.  
 
“Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked 
to possession of a durable network or more or less institutionalized relationships of 
mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group 
– which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned 
capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the 
word.” (Bourdieu 1986, p. 51 ) 
 
It is noteworthy to emphasize that social capital is, per se, network-based. 
However,  as  it  is  sometimes  confused  in  the  literature,  ‘social  capital’  and  ‘social  
networks’ are not interchangeable terms. Resources that constitute social capital are 
embedded into social networks and, hence, networks provide access to these resources 
(Lin, 2005).  
Bourdieu (1986) foregrounds the plurality of the forms of capital 
controlled by various actors.  He differentiates among economic, cultural, and social 
capital. The modes of existence of economic capital include money, shares, and other 
material items that can be institutionalized in the form of property rights. Cultural 
capital takes the form of educational qualifications and various cultural goods, and may 
be institutionalized in diplomas and certificates. Social capital, as already outlined 
above, lies in the possession of a durable network. Its volume depends on the size of the 
network of connections that can be mobilized for the sake of gaining a certain personal 
advantage. Social networks, in Bourdieu’s line of reasoning, do not emerge 
unconditionally but need to be gradually constructed through the medium of various 
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investment strategies (Portes, 1998). Therefore, networks become an object of 
investment with the returns accrued in either short or long term.  
Taking the aforesaid into the consideration, I propose to extend the 
approach to investments into social network by arguing that the motives behind 
transnational remittances may transcend well beyond the materialistic expectations of 
future reciprocal transactions. As Mosutti (2004, p. 225) rightfully argues, the concept 
of generalized reciprocity can enrich the understanding of social exchange taking place 
in kinship groups. In close kin circles the failure to repay a favour does not, as a rule, 
entail any punitive measures or exclusion from the network. Thus, in this context, the 
social factor outweighs the materialistic one (Ibid.). I attempt to apply the notion of 
generalized reciprocity to the realm of transnational remittances. It is therefore that I 
suggest that remittance behaviour can be characterized by instrumental as well as 
altruistic motives.  
 
 
1.1.2 The perpetual circle of capital reproduction  
 
The economic, cultural, and social forms of capital define the status and possibilities of 
its holder in a society. It is important to note that all the three types of capital become 
meaningful only through the process of trading one for another (Siisiäinen, 2000).  
Bourdieu’s (1986) suggestion that forms of capital are fungible is assumed to be one of 
the key insights into the nature of social capital. Indeed, a person can hardly create any 
kind of a durable social network without contributing material resources and applying 
cultural knowledge, which enables one to establish meaningful relations with others.  
The process of exchange among various forms of capital feeds into the 
perpetual circle of capital reproduction.   
 
“The  convertability  of  the  different  types  of  capital  is  the  basis  of  the  strategies  
aimed at ensuring the reproduction of capital  […].” (Bourdieu 1986, p. 54) 
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Figure 1: Fungibility of the forms of capital 
 
According to Bourdieu (Ibid.), economic capital is at the root of all other 
types of capital, and the universal equivalent that can be uniformly applied to 
quantifying capital is labour-time. Bourdieu (1986) suggests that the concept of 
transferability of different types of capital was designed essentially as an analytical tool.  
The said tool is employed in the study of the social world in order to arrive at a better 
understanding of social class reproduction, which is defined in terms of access to 
resources. The author ties social and cultural capital into the overall picture of class 
reproduction so as to illustrate that class is being constantly reproduced not only 
through the transfer of economic resources, but also by means of resources conceived as 
social and cultural capital, and thus showing the complexity of class divisions 
(Cederberg, 2012, p. 61).  Therefore, in this study, I place social class at the core of the 
circle  as  a  critical  predictor  of  the  process  of  capital  reproduction  and  as  its  primary  
outcome.   
I employ the circle of capital reproduction in the original interpretation by 
Bourdieu (1986) as a general frame for the following analysis. I suggest, however, 
several contextual revisions in order to adapt Bourdieu’s conjecture of social capital to 
the issues under scrutiny in this research. To start with, I problematise the distribution 
of resources, embodied in different types of capital, which take place between genders. 
It is believed in the traditional Somali society that ‘good’ women are supposed to 
organize their activities around their homes by taking care of children and carrying the 
burden of household responsibilities (Kleist, 2010, p. 189). Many of these women lack 
Economic capital
Cultural CapitalSocial Capital
 
Social Class 
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even basic education and do not engage in paid employment. Relatively recently, 
however, following the civil war in Somalia and forced migration to Western countries, 
Somali women and Somali men got caught in the process of negotiating and re-
establishing traditional gender ideals. Somali women entering Western countries as 
refugees or through family reunification programmes are believed to gain more than 
Somali men by virtue of institutionalized equal opportunities concerning access to 
education and, subsequently, employment (Ibid.).  Based on this assumption, I put forth 
a hypothesis that, particularly in the context of Finland, where my study has been 
conducted, Somali women are provided with an opportunity to accumulate cultural 
capital embodied in received professional qualifications and education diplomas, and 
hence become knowledge-empowered change agents in the cycle of capital reproduction. 
As cultural capital can, in certain circumstances, be traded for economic capital, Somali 
women gain access to economic resources, some of which may be then allocated to 
remittances to support family networks back in Somalia. In this manner, the symbolic 
flow of remittances becomes an investment in social capital embedded in transnational 
social networks. Once again, I advocate for the re-conceptualisation of the notion of 
investment by arguing that material investments can bring immaterial returns, as shown 
in the circle of capital reproduction. It has to be borne in mind that returns on 
investment do not necessarily need to be ‘in the same currency’. Expected returns on 
remittances may be seen as, for instance, an upgrade of social status, respect of the 
community, or a growing sense of self- worth. These final products of exchange lie in 
the social rather than the economic domain.    
Secondly, I remodel the original theory of social capital by accounting for 
the ethnicity variable into the circle of capital reproduction. The primary purpose of this 
revision is to align Bourdieu’s theory with the main focus of this study. Additionally, 
gender, ethnicity, and class all contribute to stratification of societies (Anthias, 2001). 
Thus,  I  believe  that  ethnicity  factor  will  enrich  and  further  problematise  the  social  
relations behind capital reproduction mechanisms.  
For  the  reasons  presented  above  and  in  contrast  to  Bourdieu’s  
interpretation of social class as the principal element that forms and structures the social 
world, I modify the factors that affect the circle of capital reproduction by adding 
gender and ethnicity to its core. 
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Figure 2: Revised circle of capital reproduction 
                                                     
 
As depicted in Figure 2, the factor of social class continues to play an important role in 
the revised circle of class reproduction since it brings into the focus the socio-economic 
status of Somali refugees in the Finnish society. Inequalities among migrants in terms of 
access to material resources can be in part explained by the disparities in social and 
cultural ‘baggage’ that they immigrate with (Cheong et al, 2007). In other words, 
previous background may seriously affect the ultimate position of an individual in the 
socio-economic hierarchy of the receiving society. For that reason, I believe that the 
factor of economic capital endowment, expressed in terms of social class, can affect the 
individual capacity for transnational economic activities, which are clearly reflected in 
the scope and dynamics of remittances.   
 
 
1.1.3. Remittances as an act of social capital reproduction                                                                  
 
From the neoclassical perspective sending remittances is typically regarded as a pure 
economic action. Its determinants, however, might reach beyond solely economic 
calculations. Academic contributions to economic sociology have reinforced the 
accumulated knowledge on economic action by introducing the concept of social capital. 
The essence of the notion is based on the importance of structures and dynamics of 
Economic capital
(remittances by Somali 
migrants)
Cultural Capital
(educational attainment; skills 
and qualifications acquired 
through formal or informal 
schooling) 
Social Capital
(transnation social networks of 
migrants)
Social Class 
Gender 
Ethnicity 
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social networks, which is in stark contrast to the neoclassical focus on the individual 
goal-seeking behaviour (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). 
What makes remittances an act of social capital (re)production? According 
to Bourdieu’s (1986) line of reasoning, remittances might be understood as an act of 
transferring economic capital into social capital, with money being invested into social 
relations that are, for a certain reason, valuable for the remitter. Portes and 
Sensenbrenner (1993) identify four types of economically relevant expectations shared 
by the members of a collectivity that create and shape the social capital contained in it.  
Value interjection,  one  of  the  sources  of  social  capital,  emphasizes  the  
moral conditioning of economic action. The stress on the underlying moral order 
extends the understanding of economic transaction beyond profit-seeking behaviour. To 
transpose it to remittance practices, an individual acts upon what she or he deems to be 
a moral duty. This value-laden behaviour produces social capital that a given 
community draws upon as a resource. The second source is formulated as reciprocity 
transaction and, in contrast to the previous one, allows for individual selfish behaviour.  
In a social life where material items, information, and immaterial valuables are 
exchanged one for another, economic agents will engage in a transaction if a similar 
favour is received in return.  As far as remittances are concerned, money is being sent 
and received not only as an expression of a moral duty, but also as a means of repaying 
past  debts or in expectation to switch roles with a receiver at  some point in the future.  
The next two sources of social capital, namely bounded solidarity and enforceable trust, 
pertain  to  the  group-oriented  behaviour.  In  this  case,  the  existence  of  social  capital  is  
conditioned  by  the  common  awareness  of  adverse  environment  a  group  finds  itself  in  
and by the subordination of individual freedoms to the collective good in anticipation of 
future personal benefits (Ibid.).  
 
 
In line with the above-mentioned theoretical considerations and based on a thorough 
review of the pertinent literature, I formulated the following three research questions: 
 
1. In what way are transnational diaspora ties articulated and enacted with 
reference to social capital (re)production and remittance practices?  
2. What are the perceived gender differences in assuming the role of a remitter and 
how do these gender roles transform into social capital (re)production? 
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3. How does refugee background conflate with the social relations that undergird 
remittances? 
 
 
1.2. Data Collection and Data Description 
 
The nature of the research questions outlined in the previous section necessitates 
incontestably a qualitative inquiry. Interviewing presents itself as the most suitable 
method since investigation of individual choices and meanings attached to them is best 
discussed and constructed through the dialogue between an interviewer and an 
interviewee.  According to Steiner Kvale (2009), an investigator is working with words 
and not with numbers, with the purpose of obtaining various accounts of an 
interviewee’s experiences lived in her or his own life’s world.  My investigation, 
therefore, is designed to be both descriptive and exploratory in nature. 
I collected the data through semi-structured interviews that were 
conducted in the autumn and winter of 2011-2012. In total ten interviews, with the 
average interview time of around forty five minutes, were conducted. As a rule, I started 
off by introducing the topic of my research project, asked if there are any questions 
regarding the purpose of the study, and proceeded with questions in accordance with the 
interview guide. The said guide is based on thematically grouped, open-ended questions. 
At the times when I felt  that  it  was difficult  to follow what a respondent was saying I  
asked for clarifications. Furthermore, I used a method of second questions in order to 
encourage the interviewer to give a more elaborate description of a particular life 
situation, and in order to achieve a better understanding of a particular, unfamiliar to me, 
way of thinking. In order to protect the privacy of my respondents I changed their 
names and hence in the interview analysis they appear under pseudonyms. Even though 
the main language of the interviews was English, some of my respondents used Finnish 
when they could not find a proper equivalent in English.  
The target group may be defined as educated and fully integrated into the 
Finnish labour market Somalis living in Helsinki and its surrounding areas.  The 
unintended common feature of my informants was that they all arrived to Finland in a 
short time span of five to seven years in the late 1980s and early 1990s, either as 
refugees or through family reunification programme. This time frame coincides with the 
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large Somali immigration wave into Finland as a consequence of the brutal civil war in 
1988  and  the  collapse  of  the  Somali  state  that  followed  in  1991.  The  ages  of  the  
interviewees ranged from mid twenties to early forties. 
In addition to the target group, I carried out two expert interviews that 
were used for the purposes of empirical analysis and in the concluding discussion of 
research findings and possible theoretical implications. One of the experts, who kindly 
agreed to participate in my study, was Anne Alitolppa-Niitamo (Ph.D.). She is the chair 
of the Multicultural Center of Expertise at The Family Federation of Finland 
(Väestöliittö) that promotes the values of an equal and multicultural society. The second 
of the aforementioned experts, Maryan Abdulkarim, was employed at the time of the 
interview in the Multicultural Center of Expertise in the capacity of an expert in 
multicultural affairs. Owing to the fact that she is originally from Somalia, the interview 
material was considered as representing both the target and the expert sample.   
Information from printed and online sources, further enhanced by the 
snowballing method, were used as the primary means for selecting participants for my 
study. Interestingly, respondents drawn through the snowballing method proved to be 
the most informative and frank. I attribute this fact to their non-engagement in public 
debates and other open appearances.  By contrast, those respondents who are well-
known activists in their field seemed to limit themselves to ready-made and, as a matter 
of fact, rather general statements.  
In general, it should be noted that the resultant interview material is biased 
in favour of urban, middle-class, and professional backgrounds. Gender balance was 
rather difficult to achieve owing to the lesser visibility of female Somalis in public 
discourse and their apparent reluctance to talk to an ‘outsider’.  Notwithstanding these 
difficulties, four out of ten  of my target group interviewees are women.    
Lastly, I consider it relevant to underscore that I did not seek to generalize 
the  results  of  the  study  to  the  wider  Somali  population  living  in  Finland  or  other  
countries.  Nevertheless,  the qualitative nature of the analysis allows me to make some 
informed  observations  on  the  nature  of  social  capital  in  the  individual  case  of  Somali  
diaspora in Finland, its relation to remittance practices, and the changing role of 
remittances in the process of social capital reproduction. Though not without 
shortcomings, this study can be used as an example of how to apply social capital 
theory to diaspora studies, as well as to any other investigations into remittance 
practices of refugee communities from a diasporic networks perspective. 
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 1.3. Ethical considerations 
“An interview inquiry is a moral enterprise [...].” 
(Kvale, 1996, p. 109) 
 
At the beginning of each interview I informed the study participant that confidentiality 
of the information they provide is of topical concern and constitutes a priority for me.  I 
strived to be as transparent as possible by making available the interview guide to the 
interviewees, explaining why I asked for certain information, and in what format it 
would  eventually  appear  in  my  thesis.   I  am  very  grateful  to  Marja  Tiilikainen,  
Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Helsinki, who drew my attention to the fact 
that I might run into the risk of infringing privacy rights of my informants by disclosing 
their occupational details. Owing to the fact that the Somali community in Helsinki and 
surrounding areas is relatively small, individuals who hold particularly visible posts in 
public  affairs,  community  work,  health-care  sector  etc.,  are  widely  known  in  Somali  
circles, as well as in the wider circles of the Finnish society. It is therefore that I limited 
the  information  at  hand  about  my  informants  to  the  basic  facts  which  are  directly  
relevant to the analysis. 
In this thesis, I adopted Kvale’s approach to ethical research, who distinguished 
among scientific responsibility, relation to the subjects, and researcher’s independence 
(Kvale, 1996, p. 118). The responsibility of a researcher to safeguard his or her 
informants’  right  of  privacy  is  to  assess  beforehand  the  possible  ramifications  that  
future research findings might have for the individuals participating in the study, and 
also for the wider social group that they belong to. I did my best to comply with this 
recommendation.  In  addition,  I  continuously  reflected  on  the  nature  of  my  relation  to  
the  subjects,  trying  to  make  it  as  balanced  and  as  impartial  as  possible.  Finally,  I  
devoted extra effort to maintain a professional distance to my informants and to report 
the findings from my own independent prospective instead of letting the views of the 
interviewees influence the research results. 
I have been keeping in view the abovementioned ethical issues throughout the 
research project, including the planning stage, the interview situation itself, and the 
analysis and reporting part. It doubtlessly influenced the way I designed the interview 
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guide and, subsequently, reported on the sensitive issues that emerged during the 
interview process.  
 
 
1.4. My role in the research and the limitations of the study 
 
I constantly reflected on my role in the study as an individual with a certain cultural and 
knowledge base, which might have had a bearing on the direction this study has taken.  
It is important to note, however, that, despite the above precautions, my position as an 
outsider to the Somali diaspora affected to some extent the level of trust with which my 
informants might have approached my inquiry. Personally, I experienced myself as an 
outsider on multiple levels.  
On one of the levels I consider myself to be a cultural outsider who is not fully 
familiar with internal norms pertaining to this particular ethnicity. Concerning the 
religious aspect, since I do not have a Muslim background I had to deal with the risk of 
overlooking or oversimplifying the interpretation of some arguments that could come 
from a certain religious context. Also, as the values of gender equality are not uniformly 
accepted among the Somali diaspora, where women and men have rigid ‘traditional’ 
roles in the society, I felt that in some aspects my research did not meet with sufficient 
support from my male informants. When faced with this kind of limitations, I sought to 
emphasise my status as a researcher. 
Secondly,  I  felt  as an outsider in terms of not being part  of the Somali  refugee 
history.   Since  I  could  hardly  imagine  the  hardships  that  some of  them had  had  to  go  
through, I faced the difficulty of grasping in its entirety the personal experiences my 
informants as refugees, who belong to the ‘victim’ diaspora (Cohen, 2008). However, I 
attempted to express empathy and understanding of their experiences. This also applied 
to the exploration of meanings that the refugees attach to their transnational 
engagements, in particular, to the socioeconomic action of remitting money.  
It should be acknowledged that my role in the research as an explorer of a 
foreign culture, remittance practices are part of which, also presented itself as an 
advantage. Due to the fact that I am not of Finnish origin, power relations defining the 
interviews  unfolded  in  a  different  way  than  they  most  certainly  would  if  I  were  a  
Finnish national.  I was often perceived as a representative of the Russian immigrant 
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group and was not deemed to be in the position to judge the conformity of the Somali 
way of thinking or acting to the mainstream societal values. I believe that the experience 
of ‘otherness’ that we shared instilled a certain level of trust in our respective 
relationships.   
 
 
CHAPTER 2: SOCIAL CAPITAL, REMITTANCES AND DIASPORA 
2.1. Somali diaspora in Finland 
 
The word diaspora (from Greek ????????)  literally  means  “scattering  of  seeds”  or  
“dispersion” and denotes transnational movement and ties (Anthias, 1998).  Wahlbeck 
(2002, p. 222) suggests that diaspora defined as a ‘transnational social organization 
relating both to the country of origin and the country of exile’ provides a better grasp of 
the social reality refugees live in. However, in the postmodern discourse the research 
focus has shifted from ‘roots’ to ‘routes’ (Anthias, 1998). 
To avoid confusion with multiple interpretations of diaspora, which in 
contemporary academic discourse came to denote any ethnic group living outside its 
homeland that forms more or less homogeneous community visibly different from the 
host society, I will focus on the conceptualization of diaspora suggested by Safran 
(1991).  Thus, a diasporic group can be described as a ‘triadic relationship’ among: 
 
1. “a collectively self-identified ethnic group in a specific context”; 
2. “globally dispersed group’s co-ethnics”; 
3. “a country of origin or a local context where diasporic members came from.” 
(Safran, 1991) 
 
Cohen (2008) classifies African diaspora as a victim diaspora by pointing 
out to the critical ‘break events’ that describe the varying histories of African peoples. 
The label of a victim diaspora is usually produced through self-description and 
construction by others in terms of a victim (Ibid.). Due to its long history of 
displacement following the violent conflict in 1991 Somali diaspora, as a part of the 
wider African diaspora, has been victimized publicly as well as within its inner circles. 
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Common experiences of struggles in the face of adversity resulting from 
immigration and integration in a new country are believed to instil in immigrants, and 
particularly in refugees, a unique sense of unity that has been described as diasporic 
consciousness (Clifford, 1994) .  The experience of living in a diaspora can also be 
referred to as double consciousness (Dayal, 1996).  It emphasizes the fact that diaspora 
is  oriented  towards  the  homeland  as  well  as  towards  the  country  of  immigration  or  
asylum.  Arguably, this kind of diaspora double consciousness plays an essential role in 
directing cross-border activities. 
As not diaspora studies but rather remittance practices embedded in the 
diasporic context are the primary focus of the thesis, I will restrict the definition of the 
concept to the brief introduction above and will proceed with the particular case of the 
Somali diaspora in Finland. 
It is estimated that there are sizeable settlements of Somalis in at least 60 
different countries globally. Owing to this fact Somali community is believed to be one 
of the most dispersed communities in the world. What significantly differentiates 
Somalis from other classic diasporas being subject to forced dispersal due to a violent 
conflict or other types of adversities is that in case of Somalia there is no external 
enemy per se. Since Somali groups are regarded to be exceptionally homogenous in 
nature, the civil war that led to the mass exodus of the population took place along the 
clan lines and not among different ethnic groups (Pirkkalainen, 2005). 
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In the Finnish context, Somalis are considered to be the fourth largest 
group of immigrants and the largest ethnic community coming from Africa 
(Pirkkalainen, 2009).  In Figure 3 one  can  see  the  10-years  changes  in  the  size  of  the  
population with Somali as a native language that is living in Finland. Judging by the 
statistics, the numbers doubled between 1997 and 2007.  
In 2010 the Somali foreign-language group made up 12,985 persons 
(Statistics Finland, 2010) . Youth and children are overrepresented in the demographic 
distribution of the Somali population in Finland (see Figure 4 below). Refugee families 
living in exile are typically smaller in size than in the country of origin due to incidents 
of death of one or more family members during the violent conflict in Somalia. A 
considerable number of children under the age of eighteen arrived as unaccompanied 
minors and are said to have spent some time in institutions prior to entering Finland 
(Alitolppa-Niitamo, 2002).    
 
Figure 3: The largest foreign-language groups in Finland 1997 and 2007 
(Source: Statistics Finland) 
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Figure 4: Somali-language group by age, 2010 (source: Statistics Finland) 
 
The largest wave of Somali immigration to Finland took place in the late 
1980s and the beginning of 1990s. A large share of asylum seekers arrived through the 
Soviet Union because Finland used to be the only Western country with which it had a 
common border.  Moreover, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country was not 
able to host Somalis any longer - a fact that eventually led to their mass exodus. Somalis 
arriving to Finland from the early 1990s onward form the largest ethnic group of asylum 
seekers. For that reason, the said large-scale and continuous in-migration of Somalis 
into Finland is considered to be one of the hallmarks in the immigration history of the 
country (Alitolppa-Niitamo, 2004).  
One  of  the  cultural  traits  that  unifies  Somalis  living  in  different  parts  of  
the world is religion since approximately 99.8 per cent of the population is Muslim 
(Pirkkalainen, 2005). Clanship is another important constituent of Somali identity. The 
traditional Somali society is organized along the clan lines with six main clan families 
at the core: Darood, Dir, Hawie, Isaaq, Digil and Rahanwein, and numerous sub-clans 
adjunct to them. Taditional extended Somali families are large in size and involve 
gradparents, cousines, and, in some cases, close friends (Ibid.).  
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2.2. Remittances and hawala agency as a network of trust  
2.2.1. Hawala or xawilaad 
 
Xawil is a Somali word, which has its roots in Arabic language with xawilaad being a 
Somali  rendering  of  hawala.  It  is  commonly  interpreted  as  the  ‘transfer  of  debt’  and  
understood in terms of money or responsibilities. It can also mean ‘trust’ pertaining to 
personal ties and relationship of trust between a customer and a remitter (Glushchenko, 
2005).  Hawala or xawilaad is a largely informal remittance transfer system which is ran 
and used predominantly, but not exclusively, by Somalis (Horst, 2004). Hawala has 
been hailed as ‘an illegitimate child of financial system, a lubricant for business, a 
frictionless system, and a banking system for the poor’ (Glushchenko, 2005, p. 29).  
The process of money remittance through hawala unfolds in the following 
way.  The system is operated by a network of dealers, or hawaladars, who, after having 
received a payment instruction, get in touch with their partners at payment destinations 
with  the  request  to  pay  out  an  agreed  sum  of  money.  Normally,  the  partners  will  
eventually settle the outstanding debt at a later point in time. Seen in the light of the 
aforesaid, the transfer involves movement of debt value, rather than actual money. 
Relationships between hawaladars operating from different locations are based solely on 
mutual trust (Vertovec, 2009). Trust is usually built around family, clan, or business 
networks (Lindley, 2005).  An undeniable benefit of this mechanism for its users lies, 
firstly, in a very low commission, which, on average, constitutes 5 per cent of the 
amount and is accompanied by discounts during the holy month of Ramadan. Secondly, 
by virtue of the system’s deep embeddedness in ethnic networks, one does not need to 
know  the  address  of  the  recipient  to  deliver  the  payment.  Clan  name  is  used  as  a  
personal identification in Somalia and serves as a postal address (Hammond, 2011).   
Hawala companies have had a long history of reliance on clanship 
connections with regard to managing money transfers. In the past hawala money 
transmitters were hiring people almost exclusively from their personal clan networks in 
order to ensure loyalty. As maintained by Lindley (2010), previously, it was seen as a 
necessary measure to counter the internal threat of employee opportunism. Staffing 
hawala  companies  with  one’s  clan  members  was  also  seen  as  a  sign  of  support  to  kin  
networks. Subsequently, business contacts were established also outside clan networks 
to provide for the expanding business (Ibid.). 
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As shown by the literature overview, the history of xawilaad has not been 
clearly articulated in the existing body of research on migrant remittance practices. 
Some authors claim that it dates back to the period of ‘oil boom’ in the Gulf States, a 
region in which, at this time, a significant number of Somali economic migrants were 
concentrated. According to this view, Somalis who engaged in cross-border trade used 
to collect money from Somali migrant workers to purchase goods destined for further 
sale  in  Somalia.  After  the  commodities  were  successfully  sold  the  money was  handed  
over to migrants’ families in Somalia who exchanged it into the local currency. This 
intricate symbiotic relationship between cross-border trade and migrant remittances, 
pursuant to this line of thought, used to exist only in the context of the Arab states of the 
Persian Gulf. However, following the civil war and the collapse of the state in Somalia, 
xawilaad evolved into a transnational remittance transfer organization with strong 
presence on the African continent, in the Middle East, and in the Western countries 
where Somali diaspora settled (Horst, 2004)1.  
Having said that, the experts do agree on the fact that the phenomenon of 
hawala  has  evolved  into  a  remittance  transfer  system,  which  was  given  rise  to  by  the  
need  of  displaced  Somali  refugees  to  support  their  families  and  kin  members  at  the  
country of origin. Thus, the geographical patterns of hawala transfers are shaped by 
unidirectional flows of money from developed to developing countries. Since the 
country’s financial system was completely obliterated as a result of the violent civil law, 
hawala money transfer system turned out to be the only remaining feasible option to 
remit money to Somalia.    
In the contemporary context the hawala system has been undergoing a 
process of continuous change towards increased formality and in view of intricate 
banking regulations introduced in developed countries (Lindley, 2005). After the 9/11 
drama in New York the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) issued specific regulations 
to combat terrorist financing, and hence exercising political and economic pressures on 
non-compliant countries. While before 9/11 a distinction was made between ‘white 
hawala’ and ‘black hawala’ practices, which implied different levels of formality of the 
hawala system, after the terrorist attack it has been principally viewed by Western 
banking regulators as serving illegitimate purposes. While some hawala operators 
                                                             
1 According to a different perspective, the hawala phenomenon might have first appeared many centuries 
ago with merchants travelling along the Silk Road. Some experts claim that its roots can be traced back to 
the ancient Egyptian system of loans, while others believe that it is no less than seventy eight centuries 
old with its birthplace in Hindustan (Glushchenko, 2005).   
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ceased to exist, others moved towards ‘professionalization’ and compliance (Lindley, 
2010).  
Drawing on the work by Portes (1995, p. 25), I argue that the 
incorporation of the hawala money transfer agency into Western countries can be best 
described  in  terms  of  structural  and  relational  embeddedness.  By  structural  
embededdness the author understands the limits and possibilities offered by polity and 
society in the country of incorporation. Relational embeddedness, on the other hand, 
stands for the benefits and constraints that affiliation with the given ethnic social 
networks might create.  
Moving towards the Nordic context of incorporation, in some countries 
(e.g., Norway), the remittance agencies face particularly tough regulatory measures. 
Since none of the hawala agencies hold sufficient capital to comply with the registration 
and licensing requirements, sending money through hawala has become illegal in the 
aforesaid country (Tharmalingam, 2011). For that reason, structural embeddedness of 
the money transfer agency in Norway is characterized by a hostile environment that 
realizes itself in economic pressures. In other Nordic countries, the agency has 
developed differently, in line with local regulatory and societal constraints. In Finland, 
for instance, the hawala agency called Dahabshiil has become very diligent in its 
operations to comply with the local regulatory environment.   
Relational  embeddedness  of  hawala  can  be  articulated  in  terms  of  its  
association with ethnic social networks. As outlined above, hawala agencies used to be 
organized, and some might still be, along the lines of clanship in order to uphold its 
moral code of trust and mutual interdependency. Close relationship between the 
customer and the remitter adds to the relational embeddedness of the company in the 
social field. 
As mentioned above, trust realized in mutual loyalty between hawala 
operators and hawala customers is believed to be embedded in family, business, and 
clan social networks. In my understanding, considering the way how hawala agents are 
thought to settle their outstanding debts, and taking into account the high loyalty 
towards regular customers, the money transfer agency can be referred to as a trust 
network. The global web of hawala agencies serving the diaspora’s needs is therefore a 
manifestation  of  social  capital  reproduction  through  a  continuous  flow  of  remittances  
facilitated by trust relationships.  
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In conclusion, it should be stressed that the concepts of trust and clan with 
reference to the hawala money transfer agency seem to overlap. Therefore, I suggest 
that the concepts should not be viewed separately from each other. Clan affiliation, as a 
rule, implies relationship of trust, and trust is often, but not always, tied to clan 
networks. The complexity that is embedded within these two concepts is difficult to 
overestimate and, perhaps, it should be best investigated on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 
2.2.2. Refugee remittances 
 
In the absence of a functioning state with institutionalized financial system, remittance 
companies are the only existing money operators in Somalia. Coming from roughly a 
million  Somalis  living  in  diaspora  abroad,  remittances  constitute  a  major  socio-
economic force and amount to one billion US dollars annually. Providing for the 
everyday needs of around one third of the population, remittance business is a genuine 
backbone  of  the  national  economy and  a  safety  net  in  the  absence  of  a  social  welfare  
state (Waldo, 2006). While considering the significance of remittances in the macro-
economic prospective as well as for individual households and kin networks, it is 
important to explore the social relations underlying these cross-border activities.  
The social fabric of transnational economic activities is essential for 
understanding remittances in terms of social capital reproduction. With regard to 
refugee experiences of remitting, motivations and obligations that affect flows of capital 
may both differ and partly overlap with those of labour migrants. Forced migration 
background is a major reason for the disparities in remittance patterns between labour 
migrants and refugees.  Refugees forcibly leave their countries driven by personal 
security considerations rather than for the purposes of profit maximization. 
Paradoxically, however, quite often they become remitters at a later stage. Before a 
refugee becomes an economic agent that is actively engaging in transnational economic 
activities a considerable amount of time may elapse since the original arrival into the 
country.  For  some refugees  remittance  history  starts  with  a  particular  incident  back  in  
the home country. Some, conversely, start remitting shortly after their arrival by 
drawing on sources such as social benefits or unskilled employment. Refugees do not 
remit money solely to their homelands as their dependants can be displaced across 
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different developing countries. One distinctive feature of refugee remittances is that the 
intensity  of  money  flows  does  not  usually  decrease  during  the  times  of  economic  
downturns even though it is widely believed to be the case for general migrant 
remittances (Lindley, 2007). The rationale behind refugee remittance practices is 
diverse and may simultaneously constitute the source of social capital, spanning from 
moral considerations to instrumental motives, such as expectance of reciprocal favours.  
However, recognition of refugees as economic actors is a rare 
phenomenon. As argued by Horst (2004), while labour migrants are commonly viewed 
as an economic element of international migration, refugees are assumed to form the 
political element. Nevertheless, overlooking the agency of refugees in directing 
economic resources is equivalent to denying their significant transnational engagement.  
In what way do refugees draw and influence upon their transnational social networks 
when  remitting  and  what  is  their  role  in  social  capital  reproduction  in  the  context  of  
diaspora are all questions that require further investigation. 
 
 
2.3. Remittances and women agency: empowered and networked.  
 
“Remittances are the glue that holds many families together.” 
(Hammond, 2010) 
 
Women’s participation in the creation and reproduction of social capital is a largely 
under-researched area. Whereas social capital, economic capital, and cultural capital 
coexist in a gendered social field, the implications of this are not entirely clear. A better 
understanding of the nature of the interaction between gender and social capital is 
needed since one-size-fits-all approaches to social capital do not reflect the reality of the 
dissimilar experiences of men and women.  It is assumed that the disparity in men’s and 
women’s perceptions of their contributions towards the creation of social capital is one 
of  the  topics  that  has  not  been  sufficiently  addressed  in  the  relevant  body  of  research  
(Healy, Haynes & Hampshire, 2007).  Based on this assumption, I attempt to shed some 
light on the women’s agency in social capital reproduction by looking at remittance 
practices. The particular focus will be on the individual perceptions of women’s 
contributions.  
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The traditional Somali society is often portrayed in the literature as 
patrilineal and patriarchal where each person knows his place in a rigid hierarchy of 
social relations. Gender relations are defined in terms of idealistic concepts of a ‘good 
man’ and a ‘good woman’, which imply different roles and statuses. Accordingly, male 
role is the role of a breadwinner, whereas the role of females is, generally, limited to 
domestic activities. However, these are just the model types and gender relations in the 
homeland as well as in the diaspora are in reality far more complex than that (Kleist, 
2010).  
Following forced migration from Somalia, life in exile fosters the 
renegotiation of gender ideals. Exposure to norms and practices in the country of 
immigration affects the way how gender is practiced in ethnic communities. The 
process of integration in Western welfare states often occurs at a different pace for 
Somali men and women. Whereas women are thought to exhibit high levels of 
adaptability to the demands of the hosting society, men quite often experience a certain 
loss  of  social  status.  The  conflation  of  unemployment,  dependence  on  social  benefits,  
and lack of recognition is believed to be tougher for Somali men than women. In a study 
by Kleist (2010), Somali men described Denmark as a ‘ladies’ country’ owing to the 
fact that welfare support systems in Nordic countries are seen as partly substituting the 
role  of  male  as  a  breadwinner.  Given  that  women  and  children  are  often  the  main  
recipients of social benefits, shifts in economic power beget reversals in social positions. 
Furthermore, thanks to the equality of access to education Somali women are given the 
opportunity to accumulate cultural capital institutionalized in education degrees and 
diplomas. Accrued cultural capital can subsequently be traded for economic capital by 
means of exchanging skills and knowledge for wages on the labour market.   
Alongside the increasing role in the decision-making process on the level 
of households, Somali women are seen as seizing more power within transnational kin 
networks. According to Lindley (2007), the gender profile of remitters to Somalia has 
noticeably changed in the post-war period. Before the outbreak of the civil war young 
male migrants were the main actors with regard to supporting their respective families 
back in Somalia through regular remittances. However, following the opening of 
opportunities for asylum in Europe and North America, women (and children) on par 
with men started fleeing the violent conflict. Having become part of the transnational 
Somali diaspora, they started sharing previously exclusive obligation of males to 
provide for the needs of their families left in the homeland. Exposed to economic 
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activities outside the household, women gradually came to be regarded as ‘better’ 
remitters than men (Lindley, 2007). These perceptions, however, are not corroborated 
by empirical data. As indicated by the World Bank, in 2004 men constituted the 
majority of senders with 53.2 per cent of the total share of estimated remittances being 
sent by males (Shire, 2006, p. 24). Nevertheless, the feminization of remittances does 
take  place  in  relative  terms.  Even  though  men  still  send  more  in  absolute  terms,  it  is  
crucial to acknowledge the manner in which women establish their breadwinner role, 
which runs directly counter to traditional Somali culture (Lindley, 2007).      
The  perceived  reputation  of  women  as  reliable  and  regular  remitters  can  
be observed in family decisions concerning international mobility. Financing travel 
expenses of a relative is commonly viewed as an investment strategy with future returns 
on ‘investment’ coming from overseas remittances. Therefore, it is crucial for the future 
wellbeing of a family to sponsor the ‘right’ person who is more likely to become a 
reliable and regular remitter. On these grounds, the decision about relocating a family 
member is often negotiated within extended family networks. Since women are 
frequently believed to be more ‘dutiful’ family members, sometimes they have better 
chances than men in securing the financial backing of the family (Al-Sharmani, 2010). 
This observation seems to support the increasing subjective awareness of the female 
domination in remittance practices.    
Seen in the light of social capital theory, cross-border remittances can be 
pictured as the glue that holds families and transnational communities together despite 
physical distances that separate them. The circulation of capital in Somali transnational 
families  strengthens  the  existing  social  ties  and  reinforces  the  sense  of  community  
(Hammond, 2010). The increasing numbers of women who support their kin networks 
through remittances assume the role of key agents in the process of capital reproduction. 
As argued by Hummond (2010), women derive a number of personal benefits from their 
acts of transnational family support.  In view of the fact that the traditional Somali 
identity is closely related to clan, sub-clan, and family ties, Somali women feel that they 
are gaining more social recognition in the community and, by being able to provide for 
the needs of their extended families, they upgrade their social statuses (Ibid.).      
While considering the importance of women’s agency in social capital 
reproduction and the feminization of remittances, it should be taken into account that 
not all Somali women assume an active role in sustaining transnational households. Still, 
a large share of Somali women living in diaspora stay at home taking care of household 
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duties (Tiilikainen, 2003). In these circumstances, their participation in capital 
reproduction seems to be rather limited.  
 
 
2.4. Negative social capital 
 
The literature on social capital is generally biased towards its positive effects. Social 
capital is believed to bring numerous benefits through membership in social networks, 
and sociability is commonly seen as a positive feature.  On the other hand, social capital 
may have less desirable consequences for those who possess it.  On its negative side, 
social capital can be seen as a rather conservative force (Ram, Theodorakopoulos & 
Jones, 2008). To paraphrase, those who lack economic or other types of capital may 
turn instead to their social equivalent and use their networks to generate personal 
advantage. This phenomenon can be easily illustrated by the example of ethnic 
entrepreneurship where immigrants find employment with their co-ethnic businesses as 
they lack the education or other cultural skills in order to find more challenging job 
opportunities on the open labour market.  
Portes (1998, p.15) identifies four further negative consequences of social 
capital:  exclusion  of  outsiders,  excess  claims  on  group  members,  restrictions  on  
individual freedoms, and downward levelling norms. Social capital generated by a 
certain  group brings  economic  advantage  to  its  members  -  this  may,  however,  lead  to  
the exclusion of outsiders who cannot profit from the beneficial treatment of that group. 
An  example  that  duly  illustrates  this  point  is  the  phenomenon  of  the  so-called  China  
Towns  which  are  situated  in  major  metropolitan  centers  of  the  Western  world.  These  
tightly-knit communities generate advantages for its members, such as access to 
resources  or  employment,  but  at  the  same  time  they  bar  outsiders  from  entering  their  
world. As rightfully noted by Tilly (2007), tight social networks create boundaries that 
are very difficult to trespass.  
The negative consequences of excess claims are easily discernible in the 
case of Somali remittances and coping strategies that Somalis develop in order to avoid 
excessive claims on their personal income. Hammond (2010, p.126) describes 
transnational Somali networks as ‘webs of obligation’. The respondents in her study 
reported that they regularly spend virtually half of their monthly income on remittances 
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to relatives and clan members in Somalia. They often feel overloaded with regular 
claims on their money coming from remittance recipients and complain that in Somalia 
people cannot grasp how difficult it is for immigrants to earn their living, and that they 
have to struggle to make ends meet.  
Members of a certain community may enjoy high levels of social capital, 
but,  at  the  same  time,  they  have  to  cope  with  demands  for  conformity.  In  the  case  of  
transnational Somali support systems that are enacted through remittances, the failure to 
support one’s family may bring disgrace upon that individual. A ‘failed’ remitter is 
destined  to  lose  the  respect  of  both  those  whom  he  or  she  refuses  to  support  and  the  
members of a local diasporic community as it might be difficult to ‘escape its watchful 
eye’ (Hammond 2010, p.141). Thus, a failure to conform to cultural values or to meet 
certain expectations, for instance, embodied in remittance obligations, may lead to 
disrespect or even expulsion from the ‘exclusive’ community circle. 
Downward levelling norms work for the benefit of maintaining social 
status of a certain group even though this entails preserving their disadvantaged position 
in the society. As suggested by Portes (1998), this phenomenon occurs when a certain 
group suffers from social segregation and adverse conditions.  
Furthermore, the point about social valuations of networks deserves more 
scrutiny. Anthias (2007) suggests that some negatively functioning networks may in 
fact prevent its members from pursuing advantage based on the membership in these 
networks. The said situation occurs if a social network, for example, a migrant network, 
is  disrespected  by  the  mainstream  society.  In  this  case,  any  affiliation  to  this  network  
may bring disadvantages to its members, prevent social mobility, and reduce the 
chances of an individual to succeed in the labour market.  
 
 
2.5. The question of mobilisability  
 
It would be a rather broad generalization to assume that social capital can be found in all 
social relations without accounting for the fact that not all social ties in a social network 
can be used for generating personal advantage. In the case of the Somali community in 
Finland, it is a rather faulty approach to presume that all Somalis are equally engaged in 
remittance practices or all of them feel to be a part of a transnational migrant network. 
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While some of them genuinely feel morally obliged to send remittances and enjoy to 
some extent the reciprocal support from their network, others, on the other hand, prefer 
to mix with the mainstream society and not to be associated either with other Somalis or 
with any kinds of diasporic activities, including remittances.  
Floya Anthias (2007) suggests that the concept of social capital should be 
restricted to ‘mobilisable’ social ties and networks. It should be clarified, however, that 
‘mobilisable’ denotes being potentially usable for pursuing social advantage. Put 
differently, and pursuing  Bourdieu’s way of reasoning, social ties and networks are 
mobilisable if they can be traded for other types of capital.  To illustrate, one can 
imagine two families living in Somalia, both of which have relatives living abroad. One 
of the families receives remittances from overseas, while the other does not. The family 
that does receive any financial support from the said family members has mobilisable 
social ties, that is, it can successfully laverage them for pursuing personal advantage.  
This provision is also touched upon by Bourdieu who maintains that: 
“The volume of the social capital possessed by a given agent thus depends on the 
size of the network of connections he can effectively mobilize and on the volume 
of the capital […] possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is 
connected.” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 51). 
 
The idea of the mobilisability of social ties and networks implies a degree 
of heterogeneity within groups and suggests that a qualitative inquiry into individual 
practices and motivations might yield more accurate explanations with regard to the said 
phenomena.  
 
CHAPTER 3: INTERVIEW ANALYSIS 
3.1. Introducing remarks 
 
The following section introduces the empirical analysis and is meant to suggest the 
practical implications of the methodological approach outlined in Chapter 1.   
In the early stages of the analysis I came to the realization that the division 
of the interview material into clear-cut analytical categories is far from being a 
unidirectional and unambiguous. I found myself caught in the process of moving 
repeatedly from individual interview parts to the interview as a whole.  Eventually, I 
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arrived at the conclusion that thematic labelling of the material requires the capability to 
see the holistic picture of the interview set as a unit while keeping in mind the 
individual  attributes  of  each  and  every  interview.  Seen  in  the  light  of  the  aforesaid,  I  
identified this process with the use of the hermeneutic circle where neither the text as a 
whole nor its separate blocks can be understood without reference to one another.  
The categories eventually decided upon are fluid, seemingly flowing one 
into another. Furthermore, some of the sophisticated and ambiguous statements hardly 
fit into the strict frames of a particular category. Therefore, first, I assigned certain 
statements to several categories due to the fact that they convey a wide range of 
meanings. Next, following the methodological recommendation of Schmidt (2004), I 
narrowed down the multiple labels that were assigned to one statement to one dominant 
description.  The careful interpretation of the interview material revealed the following 
themes, which I believe best characterize the content of my interviews:  
 
? Hawala discourse (narrative and counter-narrative); 
? Remittance behaviour: altruistic versus instrumental (or the sources of social 
capital); 
? The politicized issue of transnational diasporic activities; 
? Perceived women’s agency in social capital (re)production. The agency of 
caregivers; 
? Transnational capabilities: willingness to engage in (economic) activities that 
transcend national borders;  
? Articulations of negative social capital.  
 
The usability of the above analytical toolkit was scrutinized in the course 
of several rounds of reading the texts. Throughout the process of refining the categories, 
some of them were significantly altered, while others were omitted altogether.   
As put by Schmidt (2004), the subsequent stage of interview analysis 
entails applying categories obtained from the material to the  material.  It  should  be  
mentioned in this context that some of the results came to be counterintuitive to the 
original expectations and prompted me to rethink my approach towards remittances 
with reference to the social capital theory.  
The interview analysis is organized as follows: each subsection of the 
analysis begins with a theme topic and a relevant quote, which I then attempt to position 
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in the theoretical framework of social capital, as conceptualized by Bourdieu. The 
subsections are designed in a manner to allow for the main narrative to naturally unfold 
itself and hence lead to the answers to the three research questions posed in Chapter 1. 
There was no purposeful effort to arrange the quotes in chronological 
order  or  in  the  sequence  that  they  appeared  in  the  dialogue.  It  is  my  firm  belief  that  
rearranging the quotes facilitates the process of identifying contradictions and 
ambiguities in the articulation of my interviewees’ experiences and perceptions. 
Moreover, as duly noted by Schmidt (2004), replies to some open-ended questions can 
appear later in the interview as the person is elaborating on a different question.  
 
 
3.2. Hawala discourse (narrative and counter-narrative) 
“Hawala? It’s a remittance company. And it is legal.” 
 
Hawala remittance agency is surrounded by numerous myths. The legality of its 
operations and its suspected connection to Islamist groups serve as some highly 
politicized topics in Western countries, including Finland. Waldo (2006) elaborates on 
the following myths and claims that the following statements, among others, 
characterize the predominant metanarrative about hawala: 
 
1. Hawala transfer services are neither legal nor registered and do not pay taxes; 
2. Their operations are not transparent and do not comply with the Anti-Money 
Laundering regulations because of their association with Somalia; 
3. Clients’ money is not safe if remitted through hawala. 
 
According to Waldo (2006), none of these statements are true. However, 
mass-media is often seen as a main means of reproducing these metanarrative. My 
informants appear to be virtually unanimous in their belief that hawala is a legal, ethical, 
and highly credible money transfer service. By arguing that the said agency operates in 
a completely different manner than in the image conveyed in public discourse, my 
informants  construct  a  counter-myth  that  is  in  clear  opposition  to  the  myth  of  the  
majority. Presented below is an excerpt of their remarks on the topic.  
36 
 
 
 
 
I don’t ask the police [if she can use hawala to send money - NG] because I work.  
It is my money that I am sending. Take me to the court! (Leylo, 2012). 
 
It  is  a  very  reliable  and  very  legal  organization.   I  am very  negative  towards  any  
informal systems. Many Finnish people think that Somalis, who send money to 
Somalia support terrorist groups! Why do they think so? It really makes me angry. 
Some journalists from the Finnish media make it even worse. Many people here ask 
why do Somalis need to send money to Somalia, and it affects the image of Somalis 
negatively (Aasiya, 2011).   
 
Some of the Finnish authorities question it, they are not sure if it’s legal. But they 
pay taxes to the Finnish state as any other Finnish company does! I wouldn’t send 
my money via hawala if it was illegal. I would not trust it (Aasiya, 2011).  
 
Hawala? It’s a remittance company. And it is legal. (Abshir, 2011). 
 
The above-mentioned statements evidently demonstrate how my 
interviewees engage in the construction of a counter-narrative in response to the 
metanarrative where hawala often appears as an illegal entity that is directly or 
indirectly  linked  to  terrorists  groups.  They  felt  that  it  necessary  to  emphasize  that  
hawala is an official money transfer company and that it fully complies with Finnish 
banking regulations. In their claims, the interviewees displayed sings of emotional 
activation as if they perceived hawala as a crucial constituent of Somali culture and 
identity. The allegations coming from media that the said money transfer agency is 
illegal or has links to Islamic fundamentalist were perceived by them as an assault on 
Somali cultural norms and practices. 
It is noteworthy to mention that the formality-informality discourse should 
be viewed as relative and context-bound. I second Anna Lindley’s (2005) opinion that it 
is  particularly  difficult  to  draw  a  line  between  formal  and  informal  activities  in  the  
context of a country which has been without a functioning state since 1991. Moreover, 
the social constructs of bad and good money that dominate the debate about the 
legitimacy of certain financial practices, including hawala, point to the fact that there 
might exist a clearly structured space for global finance and a separate space for 
‘underground’ money. De Goede (2007, p.142) calls this vantage point ‘financial 
fetishism’  and  argues  that  it  is  used  to  ‘freeze  the  contradictions’  that  characterize  the  
financial world. One, however, should take into the account the complexities, 
interdependencies, and ambiguities existing in the world of global finance. Also, it 
requires a great deal of cultural sensitivity in order to make informed judgements 
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concerning this phenomenon. This topic is discussed in more detail in the following 
subsection. 
It is notable that in the conversations with my Somali informants hawala 
was never spoken about in religious terms, even though it is believed to be culturally 
intertwined with Islam. According to the Encyclopaedia of Islam, hawala means a 
‘cession of a debt through the transfer of a claim’ (Razavy, 2005, p. 282). Its association 
with Islamic values is primarily rooted in the absence of interest charges, which are 
replaced with a nominal commission fee. This commission fee is seen by hawala 
practitioners as overhead and not as un-earned interest. This mode of operation is 
believed to stem from the Islamic doctrine of usury, which is harshly condemned by the 
believers (Ibid.).  
Taking hawala out of the cultural context may signify a desire to see it as 
westernized and integrated into the Finnish socio-political life. According to Razavy 
(2005), the labelling of hawala as Islamic and, consequently, illegal banking, in the 
opinion of those who regularly rely on it, testifies to both the cultural insensitivity of 
financial regulators and their ignorance to the fact that Western banking mechanisms 
might be inefficient in certain areas. Additionally, it testifies to the general fear of the 
unknown. The economic pressure that Western authorities put on hawala officers in 
various countries is seen by many of its users as an attack on non-Western values.   
 
Hawala is like a banking system. It is similar to the Western Union company 
(Garaad, 2011). 
 
As if in attempt to transfer its qualities and reputation onto hawala, Garaad 
compares hawala to Western Union. Putting the Somali remittance company into the 
framework of a well-known and both politically and economically accepted Western 
entrepreneurship renders hawala stripped of its cultural qualities and its embeddedness 
into ethnic social networks. Moreover, this argument constitutes a repudiation of any 
associations with Islamist groups that hawala agency might have as well as it testifies to 
the sensitive issue of legality, which most of the Somalis try to avoid.  
Apart from comparing hawala to its western equivalent, some of the 
interviewees assert proudly that not only does hawala equal Western Union, but it is 
better.  
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- Western Union is very bureaucratic and very expensive as well.  When you use 
Hawala, your relatives get money the same day, and you pay only the price of 
five per cent of the transfer. Also people from Hawala know every Somali who 
uses their services. They know where to find you if anything happens. So, they 
can send money for you when you don’t have money, and you can pay it back 
to them the next day or even later.  
- Do you have to pay an interest rate for this? 
- What? No! (Aasiya, 2011). 
 
In this statement Aasiya makes an unequivocal reference to the core 
features of the hawala’s code of practice that makes it so attractive to its users. Its 
relative inexpensiveness counts as one of them. The commission of 5 per cent is indeed 
comparatively low if compared to what other money transfer agencies charge for their 
services. As private remitters send typically small amounts of money, which, on average, 
do  not  exceed  two hundred  US dollars,  a  flat  commission  of  about  fifteen  US dollars,  
which is charged by such transfer services as Western Union or Money Gram, makes a 
single transaction quite expensive. As estimated by the International Monetary Fund, 
while  the  ‘formal’  banking  sector  charges  from  10  to  20  per  cent  of  the  total  transfer  
amount, hawala officers in global locations offer a flexible rate between 2 and 5 per cent 
(Schaeffer, 2008).  
Trust is a further factor for hawala’s popularity. As explained by Aasiya, 
the relationship of trust which hawala employees develop with their regular customers 
can function as collateral as well as a safeguard to ensure that everyone fulfils his or her 
obligations. Thus, personal ties guarantee integrity of all the parties involved in money 
transfer transations. This point is confirmed by Leylo, who maintains that: 
 
Other  people  use  it  too,  because…  it  is  trust.  Many  NGOs  are  using  it  as  well.  
There is no bank there. This is the bank. And it is present everywhere in the world 
(Leylo, 2012).  
According to Glushchenko (2005), hawaladars recognize that the system 
would not function without the element of unconditional trust. The fact that a potential 
violator of the unwritten agreement is typically punished by the permanent exclusion 
from business  and  personal  social  networks  renders  the  possibility  of  the  abuse  of  the  
system highly unlikely. The orientation towards relationships of trust and the extensive 
reliance on the ethnic social networks makes hawala agency an active entity in the 
reproduction of social capital. This can be therefore seen as network-based and, as far as 
one can judge by Aasiya’s experience, deeply embedded in Somali social networks. The 
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said ties provide access to valuable resources, which, in the case of remittances, are 
coupled with discounted and highly reliable financial services. The reproduction of 
social capital takes place when a person draws on his or her social networks in order to 
benefit from lowered commissions on money transfers and, technically, a short-time 
loan with no interest rate. In this way, one type of capital is traded for another, which, 
according to Bourdieu, is one of the conditions for capital reproduction. 
 
“The  convertability  of  the  different  types  of  capital  is  the  basis  of  the  strategies  
aimed at ensuring the reproduction of capital  […]”  (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 54).  
 
The ability of a hawala transfer to reach its recipients in the most remote 
areas in Somalia and the high transaction speed that accompanies it were described by 
my interviewees as very important to them and their dependents.  
 
Hawala is very effective. You can send money even to areas that are far away from 
big cities.  You can send money to urban and rural  areas.  There are small  and big 
Hawala offices (Biixi, 2011). 
 
Schaeffer (2008) confirms the above-mentioned conjecture. Western 
Union and other money transfer services do not normally operate in rural areas, whereas 
hawala agents can deliver remittances to the most faraway villages in Somalia. While 
the Hawala system allows for the transaction to be completed within a short  period of 
time of one to two days, it may take much longer than that to process the transaction in 
other money transfer services (Ibid.). 
 
 
3.3. A politicized issue of transnational diasporic activities 
“Some people want to be ‘edustaja2 ’ of Somalia, I just want to be 
‘edustaja’ of myself.” 
In this section, I shall consider the fact that transnational diasporic activities, including 
economic remittances, are often conceived of by my interviewees as politically laden. 
Firstly, to set a frame for the following discourse, I briefly describe how refugee 
background, which is characteristic of the majority of Somalis arriving to Finland, is 
                                                             
2 Fin. edustaja ‘representative’ 
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believed to affect the diasporic consciousness and the way diaspora engages in 
transnational activities. I am of the opinion that a refugee background constitutes an 
essential component of the issues under scrutiny since, as suggested by Cohen (2008), 
the marker of a ‘victim’ diaspora, associated with some of the African diasporas, is 
critical to understanding life in the transnational Somali community.  
When talking with one of my informants, a young Somali man studying at 
the University of Helsinki, I noticed that he was rather reluctant to discuss issues related 
to the Somali diaspora. Whenever he shared his thoughts about it with me, he tended to 
associate the said subject matter with negative connotations and seemed to display 
emotional discomfort when referring to it. When asked directly about whether he deems 
the concept of diaspora to be loaded with negative meaning, he gave me the following 
reply:   
 
Diaspora, how I understand it, is when you are forced to leave your country. […] 
Diaspora is not something negative but it starts with a negative event when people 
are forced to leave their country (Garaad, 2011). 
 
Despite being physically separated from their homeland, many Somalis 
seem to cherish the idea of being engaged in Somali home affairs through the acts of 
transnational political contributions. It is important to recognize that the diasporic 
political transnational activities are contingent on a sense of group identity, which 
develops through mobilization that arises in reaction to a certain critical event (Hoehne, 
Feyissa and Abdile, 2011). One of my interviewees, a young Somali woman, elaborates 
on how she sees the Somali diaspora in Finland: 
 
Diaspora people in Finland are very active, compared to Somali diaspora in other 
countries, Sweden, UK or US, for example. Here we are, everyone is aware of the 
problems in Somalia. You feel that you have to go back to your country and do 
something (Aasiya, 2011). 
 
She further describes how, in her opinion, the Somali diaspora in Finland 
differs from the diaspora in other localities and how women take an active role in 
contributing to the restoration of Somalia. What is of particular relevance in this short 
abstract is how Aasiya emphasizes the distinctive relationship that Somali refugees have 
with the country that they were forced to flee. She says that not only does the diaspora 
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closely  follow  the  news  from  Somalia,  but  also  there  is  a  general  sense  of  obligation  
among Somalis to contribute to its rebuilding.  
Nevertheless, as accurately noticed by Wahlbeck (2002), local and 
transnational activities of refugee diasporas are far from being synchronized. The 
political divisions that occur within refugee communities, which often replicate 
conflicts in the country of origin, are a recurring topic in the studies of refugee 
communities (Ibid.). Tellingly, the informants in my study describe the Somali diaspora 
in Finland in the light of its highly fragmented nature. They seem to ascribe it both to 
the intrinsic diversity within diaspora structures and the divisions along the clan lines, 
which, notwithstanding the physical proximity of Somalia, continues to play a 
significant role. 
 
I  think  that  the  clan  system  is  the  root  cause  of  the  high  fragmentation  of  the  
Somali Diaspora here in Finland. Most immigrant societies that run away from the 
crises and violence in their homeland are fragmented. People come here each with 
their problems. We come as asylum seekers and we are not prepared to move in the 
first place. In conflict areas societies are always fragmentized (Biixi, 2011). 
 
As in the corroboration of findings by Griffiths (1997), the obvious 
reluctance  of  Somali  interviewees  to  talk  about  the  role  that  clanship  plays  in  the  
modern Somali community constituted an obstacle to the inquiry. While Griffiths was 
openly told that ‘people do not like to talk about clan’ (1997, p.12), I had to deal with 
defensive attitudes of my interviewees. Usually, the conversation about clanship did not 
go any further than a brief remark about its negative consequences for the cohesion of 
the community. While my position of an ‘outsider’ was undoubtedly a factor in their 
lack of enthusiasm discuss clanship, a sense of fatigue stemming from the feeling of 
being a subject of constant scrutiny by the mainstream society might have also played a 
role (Ibid.).   
Aasiya portrays the role of clannism in the contemporary Somali diaspora 
as intermittently dominant in the lives of many Somalis in Finland. At the same time, 
she admits that Somalis are reluctant to overtly acknowledge that and prefer to 
demonstrate their ignorance about clan relations. Furthermore, Aasiya mentions how the 
critical events back in Somalia, including numerous clashes between clan groups, affect 
the Somali community residing in Finland. 
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There  is  definitely  clan  system,  but  not  all  Somalis  would  like  to  openly  
acknowledge it. Older Somalis usually stick to it. My parents were extremely 
shocked when I married a guy from a different clan. When people from different 
clans kill each other, it affects Somali people living in Finland as well (Aasiya, 
2011). 
 
 
As  further  added  by  Garaad,  affiliation  with  a  particular  clan  may  affect  
the way people support one another in need, including, but not limited to, economic 
remittances. He was unwilling to describe clan divisions through the use of such 
categories as good or bad. In his opinion, clan per se is a neutral concept and it is people 
who sometimes misuse it and, consequently, create negative connotations that are often 
ascribed to clannism.   
 
I don’t think that the clan system is a bad thing, but people misuse it quite often. 
The clan system does not imply that you have to abuse or treat badly people from 
other clans, but, unfortunately, that’s what often happens. If you want to help your 
people from your clan - good; but it doesn’t mean that you have to be violent to 
people  from the  other  clan  in  order  to  do  that.  You  should  be  fair  with  everyone,  
regardless of the clan you belong to (Garaad, 2011). 
 
Such an ambiguity in the interrelationship between the self, diaspora, and 
the transnational diasporic political and economic engagement turned out to be a 
recurring topic in my interviews. The nature of the cross-border activities of Somali 
NGOs and associations based in Finland is perceived differently by my informants. 
Some interviewees voiced the concern that a number of Somali NGOs are organized 
along  the  clan  lines,  which  only  reinforces  the  political  divisions  in  the  diaspora,  and,  
through the mechanism of transnational interactions, may also have an impact on 
homeland politics. A degree of anxiety about the situation in which some monetary 
inputs of the diaspora could prove to be counterproductive with regard to the efforts for 
peace  and  economic  growth  could  also  be  observed.  After  all,  diaspora  is  a  diverse  
community which is characterized by conflicting interests of its members in Somalia’s 
home affairs. According to Abdile and Pirkkalainen (2011), diaspora actors and 
associations engage in a wide range of initiatives directed towards the country of origin 
and, in doing so, they aim to influence the political, economic, and societal processes in 
Somalia without being physically present there. Since diaspora does not present itself as 
a homogeneous unit with common interests and high levels of cohesion, its internal 
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formations often reflect the diverging outlooks on the country of origin. The perceptions 
of homeland across the diaspora may vary, which inevitably leads to diverse, and not 
always necessarily peaceful, ways of its construction (Ibid.). Seen in that light, clan 
affiliation has been described by my interlocutors as a major source of contrasting 
approaches to transnational diaspora engagements. 
The fact that Somali-ran NGOs and associations are subjectively 
perceived as affiliated with a particular clan and as possibly receiving financial support 
from certain clan constellations emerged as a theme in several of the interviews. This is 
an important remark in view of the collective financial and social remittances that such 
charitable  entities  as  Somali  NGOs  may  channel  to  Somalia  acting  as  clan  
‘ambassadors’. For that reason, the clan roots of social networks are further reinforced 
through the support of the global diaspora. 
 
- In your opinion, does clan system work similarly in Somalia and in Finland? 
- Here  it  is  the  same.  The  organization  might  be  a  bit  different  but  it  is  highly  
politicized  here  as  well.  Some  Somali  people  claim  to  be  a  ‘Somali  edustaja’.  
But the question is who chose them? Who stands behind them? Not all, but some 
of the NGOs are also clan-based. And they are mostly men who run them (Sahro, 
2012). 
 
Sahro compares the workings of Somali clan systems in her homeland and 
Finland and comes to the conclusion that they bear some resemblance in terms of the 
clashes of interest groups and the quests for political leadership.  As it came up in 
another conversation, some clan-based Somali NGOs are believed to employ, for the 
most part, members of their own clan networks, and hence create an environment where 
local and transnational activities are carried out exclusively for and by the affiliates of a 
particular clan. This observation led me to draw a parallel between the exclusiveness of 
some  clan-based  NGOs  and  associations  with  the  negative  social  capital  exhibited  by  
some tightly-knit social formations. One of the negative consequences of social capital 
identified by Portes (1998) is the exclusion of outsiders. Indeed, while offering certain 
benefits for clan members, some politically and clan oriented Somali NGOs may 
exclude others from their activities. This exclusionist strategy is likely to have a major 
influence on remittance patterns.    
Doubts about the impartiality of some Somali NGOs towards clan politics 
seems to go hand in hand with a chronic sense of unease that through the collaboration 
with Somali NGOs one might get entangled in the complexity of conflicting inter-clan 
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relations. When asked whether he is a member or an employee of any of the local 
Somali-run organizations, Boqol was surprisingly quick to deny any association with 
them: 
 
- Are you a member of any of the Somali organizations here? Maybe you work for 
some Somali NGO? 
- Yes,  there  is  a  Somali  Student  Association  here.  I  am  its  member.  But  no,  no  
NGOs or anything else, absolutely. If it’s only about Somalis, than it’s fine with 
me. But if it is about clans, than no (Boqol, 2012). 
 
A different respondent of mine underscored her personal individuality as a 
counter-reaction to the political clan divisions that are perceived by her as a major factor 
in the power dynamics in the community and beyond. She finds it challenging to cope 
with the political divisions and manipulations and finds a refuge in conceiving of herself 
as  an  individual  rather  than  as  part  of  a  group.  It  is  therefore  that  Sahro  disassociates  
herself from the local and transnational diaspora engagements.  
 
I am on my own, I am Sahro. Some people want to be ‘edustaja’ of Somalia, I just 
want to be ‘edustaja’ of myself. You are Russian, but you are also Nadezda, which 
is important. Nationality is not crucial, but respect is. Being a Somali also means to 
be part of the problem, and I don’t want to be part of the problem (Sahro, 2012). 
 
The marked sense of discontent with the ever-present clan divisions in 
diaspora were also expressed in the negotiations of clan identity on the inter-
generational level. Asad shared with me his concern regarding the possibility of his 
children reproducing clan identity as a result of the interaction with other Somalis in 
both public and private spaces:  
 
I have three kids who were born here in Finland, and sometimes they ask me, “Dad, 
what clan do we belong to?”  I tell them that the only clan they belong to is their 
education. “Maths is your brother, chemistry is your sister”, and so on. I also teach 
them that it is important to be nice to people and respect them (Asad, 2012). 
 
The  reproduction  of  the  traditional  Somali  organization  of  society  based  
on clan lineage seems to take place regardless of the physical proximity of Somalia. The 
significance of clan identity was often described as a first generation phenomenon, with 
a markedly decreasing importance for young Somalis who were born and schooled in 
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Finland.   At  the  same time,  however,  some Somali  parents  are  thought  to  perform the  
functions  of  ‘clan  agents’  who instill  in  their  children  a  tendency  to  discriminate  their  
peers based on clan identity.  
 
If a father comes home and he starts insulting a certain clan in front of his children, 
in front of his wife, children start asking questions about the reason he is insulting 
them. So, parents can be manipulative. Then, when this kid goes to school and sees 
another kid from that clan, most likely, he will do exactly what his father did: start 
insulting (Boqol, 2012). 
 
I consider the reproduction of clan values across generations to be one of 
the driving forces of the pervasive divisiveness within diaspora structures, also in terms 
of  their  transnational  engagements  with  the  homeland.  If  children  grow  up  in  the  
atmosphere where the clan-based social status is amplified and given a significant role, 
this might result in them internalizing and reinforcing it. The exclusiveness of belonging 
to a particular social group that is manifested by clan membership and the 
discrimination of outsiders is a transnational phenomenon. Somali diaspora is a global 
diaspora and reproduction of certain behavioural patterns can easily spread to new sites. 
 
The profound disconcert with clan divisiveness may also be expressed 
through the refusal to send money back home, a practice that is sometimes seen as 
enabling the inter-clan and inter-sub-clan feuds. 
   
For the last seven years I haven’t been remitted anything. I stopped caring about it 
because  other  Somalis  do  not  remit  money  either  when  there  is  need  for  that.  Or  
they remit money for the sake of supporting the ‘majority’ in the clan, and not 
smaller ‘sub-clans’ that are less powerful (Sahro, 2012).  
 
Conversely, as maintained by Hoehne, Feyissa and Abdile (2011), 
remittances can also be viewed as a kind of ‘positive’ transnational political engagement 
because, by insuring the economic wellbeing and economic security of their families, 
remitters indirectly contribute to the peace-building process in the country. Remittances 
help individuals to survive without resorting to violent and criminal activities, which 
continue to flourish in the context of a war economy. In the long run, the remittances 
that are invested in the education of young family members may play a central role in 
the restoration of the country’s economy. Also, diaspora transnational investments can 
be a powerful source of economic growth and political stability. As discovered through 
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individual discussions about the nature and direction of the transnational engagements 
of Somalis living in Finland, it is widely assumed that diaspora has currently a strong 
interest in real estate in Somalia. Be it on an individual basis or by means of more 
organized investment strategies, Somalis buy houses indicating a particular preference 
for Somaliland or Puntland areas where the political situation is relatively stable. Aasiya 
summarizes her view on this aspect of diaspora initiatives in the following words: 
 
- The  system  is  bad  in  Somalia,  there  is  corruption  everywhere.  I  am  not  myself  
optimistic about it, but other people will always try to change it for the better. 
Diaspora is trying to invest in Somalia, but there is not much progress with that so 
far. 
- How is diaspora investing in Somalia? 
- The biggest investment is to buy a house in Somalia. If you have a big house you 
can bring your kids there to spend summer. This trend is increasing. 
- Would you also like to buy a house in Somalia and bring your kids there once in a 
while? 
- Yes I would! In Somaliland or maybe in Puntland. Everybody has a fate. If you are 
meant to die, you will die anyways. All the Somalis are displaced in one way or 
another, but we have such a beautiful land (Aasiya, 2011). 
 
The meanings incorporated in this short passage are of multi-level 
structure. Firstly, Aasiya shows her repugnance toward corruption in Somalia, which 
destructively embraces all of the spheres of the society. Outwardly, she does not seem 
to have any confidence whatsoever in the sustainability of any contributions to Somalia 
or the possibility of long-lasting improvements. By referring to the people who want to 
change the corrupted system as ‘others’, she ultimately disidentifies herself from any of 
interactions with the governance system of Somalia. However, as discussed in further 
detail  later,  Assiya  states  that,  at  some  point  of  her  life,  she  would  consider  buying  a  
house in Somalia, which would technically constitute an investment that she previously 
opposed.   By  saying  that  ‘we  have  such  a  beautiful  land’,  she  exhibits  a  sense  of  
belonging  and  association  with  the  wider  Somali  community.  The  pronoun  ‘we’  is  of  
central importance to the aforementioned argument.  
Regarding  the  meaning  of  investments  in  housing  projects  as  an  indirect  
contribution to the economic and political stability, it has been noted by Ibrahim (2010) 
that people are less prone to engage in violent conflicts if they invest, or invested in the 
past, in the local economy. To Aasiya, investment in real estate is a collective diasporic 
endeavour that is executed notwithstanding the corrupted system. From her point of 
view, it is a group effort to change the current state of affairs in Somalia for the better. 
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This observation highlights the fact that even a single act of buying property in Somalia 
can be seen as a politically-laden action. 
To conclude, in this thesis, the transnational engagements of Somali 
diaspora are regarded by Somalis as political acts, the main purpose of which is to affect 
the power relations in their homeland.  Additionally, some of the Somali NGOs and 
associations based in Finland are viewed through the prism of values and attitudes that 
are advocated by the conflicting clans. With that in mind, it should be noted that refugee 
communities are generally believed to be fragmentized and significantly affected by the 
corresponding political divisions (Wahlbeck , 2002). Diasporic consciousness, which 
was briefly described at the beginning of this section, affects the modes of interaction 
with the homeland. In contrast to the fragmentation of activities across the diaspora, it is 
pertinent to touch upon the positive consequences of diaspora remittances for the 
economic growth and political stability in Somalia. As the Somali diaspora in Finland is 
internally complex, its transnational activities cannot be unequivocally labelled as 
positive or negative.    
 
 
3.4. Remittance behaviour: altruistic versus instrumental (the sources of social 
capital) 
“We are a collective society, we take care of one another, we send money 
back home.” 
According  to  Portes,  (1998)  the  motivations  of  the  ‘donors’,  or,  in  other  words,  those  
who make tangible or intangible contributions to exchanges which in turn lead to capital 
reproduction, are rather complex and differ considerably from those of the recipients. 
Transnational remittances to Somalia constitute a tangible resource that reinforces 
transnational social networks by acting as a ‘glue’ that holds families (and clan 
members) together, despite the geographical distances that separate them.  Remittance 
behaviour can be shaped by social relations that are practiced both in the homeland and 
the receiving country, which renders any inquiry into them an exceptionally challenging 
task. Remittance behaviour affects the way how the transformation of capital from 
social to economic, and vice versa, occurs. Why do remitters decide to engage in 
dependency relationships with their families and clan members back in Somalia? 
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Drawing on the interview material, I attempted to interpret a variety of motivations for 
remittance transfers. 
As shown by a careful examination of the interview texts, altruistic and 
instrumental motives may conjointly define the remittance behaviour.  Individuals are 
often affected by moral values, bounded solidarity manifested through the identification 
with a particular social group, and reciprocity expectations, to name just a few. The 
interplay of the above remittance motivations forms and reproduces the processes of 
capital exchange. As outlined in the theoretical part of this study, altruistic behaviour 
can be described in terms of value interjection that occur when a person acts through the 
medium of internalizing norms and moral obligations. As claimed by Anne Alitolppa – 
Niitamo, one of my expert interviewees: 
 
Somalis feel that they need to do something; they are worried about what is going 
on in Somalia. Perhaps they are experiencing a sense of guilt also. They are living 
here, while their relatives were left behind in Somalia. They feel that they are in a 
position to provide some assistance. So, they send money to Somalia individually 
or, alternatively, participate in activities organized by the community (Alitolppa-
Niitamo, 2012).  
 
The above statement seems to emphasize the moral character of economic 
transactions or, in the context of this study, transnational money transfers.  The feeling 
of being ‘in a position to provide some assistance’ and the sense of guilt, or internalized 
sense of moral obligation, might conjointly drive the remittance behaviour. 
Family values were described by my interviewees as a decisive factor in 
the remittance behaviour. According to Aasiya, family is an essential societal unit for a 
Somali. She draws a parallel to the Finnish nuclear family organization in order to make 
a point that, in the Somali context, ties among relatives are much stronger and imply a 
number of certain obligations towards one another. My informant confirmed that she 
diligently fulfils her family obligations by sending her family two hundred Euros on a 
monthly basis, despite the fact that it puts a strain on her personal budget. She confessed 
that in order to cover the subsistence expenses of her family back in Somalia she has to 
‘pinch every cent’ from her budget. She finishes her account with the following 
exclamation: “People are dying out there, you need to support them!” (Aasiya, 2011). 
Seen in the light of the aforesaid, a remittance act is effectuated as a 
response to family needs in dire situations of food shortages or other hardships. Value 
interjection as a motivation for remittances, therefore, are understood in terms of 
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fulfilling moral obligations towards relatives and clan members. As considered in a 
study by Lindley (2007), and confirmed in my own, many Somalis living ‘in exile’ find 
themselves immersed in the poignant narratives of the lives of their relatives in Somalia.  
It makes one feel compelled to provide the much needed help and support.      
Another altruistic motive behind remittances, one that is completely 
disconnected from self-centered expectations, has its roots in bounded solidarity. 
Understood as group-oriented behaviour, this rationale stems from a common awareness 
of the adversities that a social group has to cope with (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). 
Even  though  dispersed  across  the  globe,  Somalis  seem  to  preserve  the  sentiment  of  
bounded solidarity as collective memory of the dramatic events and difficult 
circumstances that they often experienced in the past. Garaad confided in me the 
following experience, which further validates the argument about the bounded solidarity 
motive: 
 
- Three years ago people were collecting money for the Kosovo cause. I contributed 
to  it.  Somalia  is  a  different  thing  of  course…  This  summer  there  was  a  Somali  
football tournament in Finland. Somalis came from the UK, the Netherlands, and 
other countries to attend this event. Some people were fundraising at this event to 
help Somalis living in Somalia. I contributed to it too. 
- Do you know whether it was a Somali NGO that was fundraising at the football 
tournament? 
- I think people were fundraising on the individual basis, but I don’t know for sure 
(Garaad, 2011). 
 
 
Firstly, this quotation shows how individuals view the ‘Somali cause’ as a 
worthy cause that one should contribute to. In spite of the differences between the two, 
the existence of a ‘Kosovo cause’ and a ‘Somali cause’ necessitates the need for 
individual contributions from those who associate themselves with the above-mentioned 
peoples.  Secondly, it identifies a group-oriented behaviour that constitutes an instance 
of the bounded solidarity. It is the common awareness of difficult conditions in Somalia 
that made the fundraising at the mentioned Somali football tournament possible. Abshir 
made  a  similar  point,  but  seen  through the  lens  of  his  own personal  experience.  He  is  
convinced that famine in Somalia is a glaring example of a situation in which one has to 
demonstrate  solidarity  with  Somali  people  and  do  his  or  her  share  to  fight  the  
humanitarian crisis. Even though he does not remit on a regular basis, he does send 
money occasionally when there is pressing need for that.  
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Another facet of the altruistic behaviour that is performed through 
bounded solidarity was articulated with the help of the concept of Somali collective 
identity (soomaalinimo),  or  Somali  kinship  system.  I  first  encountered  this  term  in  a  
study by Al-Sharmani (2006) in which it was referred to from the vantage point of 
women’s contribution to the reconstruction of soomaalinimo. In my enquiry, 
interestingly, it was a male informant who made a reference to the Somali sense of 
community:  
 
- Do you have relatives who are living in Somalia? 
- Yes  of  course,  I  do.  But  I  also  have  relatives  in  other  countries.  I  have  an  uncle  
living in Canada and a sister  in  Sweden.  Somali  people are  displaced all  over  the 
world. I went back to Somalia many times. I went there in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 
2010, so four times in total. My father used to be very influential politically, that’s 
why I am also interested and I went back there so many times. We are a collective 
society, we take care of one another, we send money back home (Biixi ,2011). 
 
In this description of the Somali collective identity Biixi makes several 
points  that  are  worth  reiterating.  Firstly,  he  mentions  the  global  nature  of  Somali  
diaspora by saying that, at the time of the interview, his relatives were all living in 
different countries. Furthermore, he brings up his relatively regular visits to Somalia 
therefore confirming his connection to the homeland and relatives, in particular his 
father, who appears to be an inspiration for his social and political activity in Finland. 
Finally,  Biixi  attracted  my  heightened  attention  by  reason  of  his  vision  of  the  Somali  
society as a collective community where mutual support and care that are sustained 
through the medium of remittances are taken for granted.  
To conclude the foregoing consideration of the altruistic motives and 
choices behind remittance behaviour, I revisit Bourdieu’s (1986) conception of social 
capital.  The  said  scholar  envisions  the  units  of  exchange  in  the  process  of  capital  
reproduction as signs of recognition: 
 
“Exchange transforms the things exchanged into signs of recognition and, through 
the mutual recognition and the recognition of group membership which it implies, 
reproduces the group.” (Bourdieu, 1986, p.52) 
 
Seen in that light, the mutual recognition of membership in the Somali 
transnational social network that manifests itself through the systems of support, 
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according to Pierre Bourdieu, results in the reproduction of the group and of the social 
capital that this group is in possession of.   
 
 
Moving on to the instrumental motives that shape remittance behaviour, 
it is important to take account of the norm of reciprocity, which plays an active role in 
the Somali collective society. Portes (1998) refers to reciprocity expectations as a 
distinct source of social capital. Viewed as such, social capital denotes the accumulation 
of obligations from others.  Within the context of this thesis, the obligation to remit may 
be perceived as a two-way process in which a ‘donor’ and a recipient are expected to 
swap  their  roles  at  some  point  in  the  future.  In  view  of  Pierre  Bourdieu’s  theory  of  
social capital, instrumental remittance behaviour is driven by the possibility to profit 
from the membership in a social network, a phenomenon that has its foundations in 
mutual solidarity: 
 
“The profits which accrue from membership in a group are the basis of the 
solidarity which makes them possible.” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 51) 
 
The primacy of the instrumental motives behind economic transactions 
was one of the reasons why Sahro made a conscious decision to stop remitting money to 
her relatives in Somalia.  She explains that the moment she realized that her financial 
support is not met with reciprocity she no longer felt obliged to send money: 
 
- For the last seven years I haven’t been remitting anything. I stopped caring about it 
because other Somalis do not remit money either when there is a real need for that.  
Or they remit money for the sake of supporting the ‘majority’ in the clan, and not 
smaller sub-clans that are less powerful.  
- What do you mean by the ‘majority’ here?  
- Within each clan there are  smaller  sub-clans.  There is  a  competition among these 
clans for the position of an ‘edustaja’ of the entire clan. These are power relations, 
and some sub-clans hold a lot of power and want to gain even more power from 
becoming an ‘edustaja’. For example, one sub-clan has a doctor, a politician, and a 
religious leader, and, in general, educated people with influence. Another sub-clan, 
for instance, has a doctor only. And the more powerful sub-clan wants to destroy 
the smaller one eventually (Sahro, 2012).  
 
In addition to making a reference to the experienced lack of reciprocity, 
Sahro comments on the power play among different sub-clans, which constitutes yet 
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another reason for her economic non-engagement. She appears to be repelled by the fact 
that some remittances serve a medium in the political manipulations of Somalia. As a 
matter of fact, the argument about the decisive role of power relations in defining the 
patterns of economic activities directly corresponds to the emphasis that Pierre 
Bourdieu (1986) lays on conflicts of interest in his writings on social capital. 
In  sum,  the  empirical  evidence  revealed  more  instances  of  altruistic  than  
instrumental remittance behaviour. Collective Somali identity and strong family values 
proved to be the focal points of my conversations with Somalis. Yet, no generalizations 
with regard to the wider Somali community are made because of the relative scarcity of 
the interview material. It is my firm belief that viewing these observations as individual 
instances of remittance behaviour and specific articulations of meanings that remittance 
practices hold for my interviewees constitutes the most suitable approach in this thesis.  
 
 
3.5. Perceived women’s agency in social capital (re)production. The agency of 
caregivers 
 “I am an independent woman, but, nevertheless, you need people’s 
support from time to time” 
The quotation used at the beginning of this sub-chapter exposes the complexity of 
experiences that are part of the transnational engagements of some Somali women. 
Independency and control over one’s own life are symbolic since the Somali women 
who reside in Finland have access to education and employment opportunities which is 
equivalent to that of Somali men. At the same time, my interviewees value the benefits 
that the membership in transnational social networks entails. The author of the aforesaid 
citation, an educated and financially independent woman, expressed the meaning that 
kin and clan networks hold personally for her by saying that it is the financial, physical, 
psychological, and also political support that is of crucial importance.  
The growing realization that women play a pivotal role in transnational 
support systems was voiced by interviewees of both sexes. However, interestingly, men 
and women seem to relate to this trend rather differently. Men preferred to converse 
about their mothers and sisters who are sending remittances in a neutral way, at times 
distancing themselves from these experiences. The female interviewees, on the other 
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hand, coloured and vivified their perceptions of women’s agency in channelling 
transnational family finances by operating from an emotional mixture of pride and 
contempt of men’s non-engagement.  
 
I think Somali women make transfers more often. Men are not that sensitive 
towards people in need. Women are closer to the family (Aasiya, 2011).  
 
According to Aasiya, it is the personal traits of men and women that 
explain the varying attitudes towards remittance obligations. Therefore, the gender role 
stereotypes embodied in the models of a ‘good Somali man’ and a ‘good Somali 
woman’, which were briefly summarized in Chapter 2, are apparent and recurrent in the 
discourse regarding the gendered nature of transnational remittances. Put in this way, it 
is the idealized sensitiveness, kindness, and orientation towards family that, allegedly, 
make Somali women good remitters. Leylo makes a similar point to that of Aasiya: 
   
I  think women are raised liked that.  It  is  the kindness of  a  woman,  or  a  girl  […].  
Sometimes you see women who never support, and some men are better at that 
than women. But the majority who support are women. There are men also, but 
there aren’t many (Leylo, 2012). 
 
Intriguingly, Aasiya makes a clear distinction between the caregiver and 
remitter qualities of Somali women living in different localities. For her, Somali women 
living in Finland are different than those living in Sweden, with Finnish-Somalis 
assuming a more active role not only with regard to remittances but also, in a broader 
sense, with regard to the citizen orientation towards the Somali nation: 
 
You feel that you have to go back to your country and do something. Somalis 
living in Sweden are not aware of that. Here, especially Somali women are active, 
very active (Aasiya, 2011).  
 
Having said that, Aasiya redirected the conversation to differences 
between genders and internal variations within them. For a number of reasons,  Somali  
women may display different attitudes towards remittances. A distinctive theme that 
emerges from the interview with Assiya is how embededness in the context of two 
different countries, namely Finland and Sweden, affects women’s involvement in 
transnational activities.  
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The facets of character of Somali women that contribute to them being 
viewed as kind and reliable providers were further elaborated upon in Boqol’s narrative 
about his mother. She came to Finland with her under-aged children as a single parent 
and, in Boqol’s words, struggled hard to secure a respectable life for her family in the 
new country. Even though in marital separation, she continues to send remittances to 
support her husband and his new family.  Another male respondent, Abshir, was very 
brief in his account of his personal commitment to transnational support systems saying 
that he does not send regular remittances but thinks that his mother does. As mentioned 
before, the reflections of men on the role of women in sustaining livelihoods of 
transnational families ranged from neutral to disinterested, while the female narratives 
were more emotional.  
Although not expressly mentioned in the theoretical framework in Chapter 
2, the interview analysis shed some light on the fact that remittance obligations may, at 
times, act as a source of marital pressure. Owing to the fact that family tensions that 
arise as a result of the unequal distribution of remittance obligations or non-fulfilment 
of transnational family duties were hinted at in several of the interviews, I believe that 
this matter deserves further investigation. Family tensions seem to be an important 
component of the social relations that underlie remittances.    
Marital tensions over remittances can emerge from a variety of sources. In 
a study by Horst (2004), some Somali female respondents revealed that they consider it 
important that their husbands allow them to continue working after getting married. 
Otherwise, they would lack sources of funding for the practice of sending remittances to 
their families. Al-Sharmani (2010) disentangles the complexity of power relations 
among family members and their conflicting goals and aspirations. Decision-making 
concerning the resource allocation of subsistence to kin members in Somalia can be a 
highly-contested issue. The collected interview material indicates only one side of the 
process in which women negotiate moral obligations and family duties. These women 
seem to be in a state of intermittent dialogue with their spouses over their commitments 
to family networks, and, more precisely, they express concern about the wellbeing of 
their in-laws, whom their husbands are supposed to support. 
 
Sometimes I say to my husband, “Hey, have you called your mother? When did 
you call  her  last  time?” Then he goes,  “I  will  call  her  tomorrow”.  And then I  ask 
next day in the evening, “Did you call?’ And he says, “Oh, I forgot” (Leylo, 2012). 
 
55 
 
 
 
Leylo elaborates on the nature of family tensions saying that she is very 
close with her mother-in-law and that she expects her spouse to take good care of her. 
Considering the fact that even distant relatives are regarded by her as belonging to one 
family unit, she cares for her mother-in-law in a manner that she would care for her own 
mother. The interviewee does not, however, consider it necessary to notify her spouse 
about the occasional remittances that she sends to her mother-in-law since, in her words, 
it is a matter of personal concern:  
 
I send money to his mother every now and then because she is my mother as well. I 
don’t have to tell him about it if I don’t feel like (Leylo, 2012).  
 
Similar concerns were raised by Aasiya, but, in her case, with regard to 
her sister-in-law.  
 
My husband wouldn’t care about his sister who lives in Somalia. I talk to her when 
she calls us, and then I have to persuade my husband to send money to her (Aasiya, 
2011). 
 
I regard this as an important observation that Leylo and Aasiya have and 
foster strong personal ties with their female in-laws only. As maintained in the existing 
literature on Somali transnational support systems, female recipients are often favoured 
over the male ones due in part to their reasonable spending.  It seems that male 
recipients have developed a bed reputation for buying qat (a popular mild stimulant in 
Somalia) with the money that is expected by the remitters to be spent on household 
needs, food, and education. Moreover, further concerns have been aired that some of the 
male remittance recipients stop working entirely, leave their families, and decide to live 
off the remittance money (Horst, 2004). Sahro endorses this widespread perception in 
the community of remitters by saying that, while women are dedicated to taking care of 
their families, men are more likely to spend money on qat. 
 
It is mostly women who are sending remittances and are taking care of their 
families. Men spent money on qat (Sahro, 2012). 
 
Albeit an important finding, the impression of women’s better reputation 
as responsible remitters and recipients cannot be straightforwardly regarded as an 
objective reality in the diaspora. Due to the limitations of the research design, it might 
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be premature to draw any conclusions regarding the changing gender nature of Somali 
remittance practices. The individual opinions summarized above constitute solely the 
subjective interpretations of changing gender roles and women’s agency in supporting 
families and clan members. Generalizations with reference to the wider Somali 
community in Finland were not the original aim of this analysis. Seen in the light of the 
aforesaid, the task of pointing out to individual perceptions and experiences and making 
pertinent observations regarding the nature of women’s agency in transnational 
remittance practices can be viewed as tentatively completed. 
 
 
3.6. Transnational capabilities: (un)willingness to engage in economic activities 
that transcend national borders 
“They have never had difficulties in their lives, they always have food, 
housing. They have never experienced it. It’s difficult for them to 
understand.” 
As suggested in one of the subsections of Chapter 2, the assumption that social capital 
lies in all social relations irrespective of their individual characteristics, which, in fact, 
vary on a case-by-case basis, is ungrounded and fails to account for the complexity on 
the ground. In order to avoid misinterpreting social capital as a universal source of 
benefits  that  everyone in a given network is willing to contribute to or can frictionless 
draw upon, one should distinguish between those social ties in Somali diaspora that are 
mobilisable and those which are not (Anthias, 2007). The following section attempts to 
argue that the question of mobilisability of social ties in relation to transnational money 
transfers is perceived to vary depending on the generation, family closeness, and 
personal identification, or, inversely, a sense of disidentification with Somali diaspora. 
Remittance fatigue may also be seen as one of the reasons undergirding the temporary 
or indefinite discontinuation of financial support. 
The  ‘generation  question’  emerged  as  a  crucial  factor  in  the  logic  of  
engagement in both the individual and collective transnational financial assistance 
mechanisms. This is to say that some of my informants felt subjectively too young to 
commit themselves to either regular remittances or to diaspora projects in Somalia, 
which require substantial investments of time and finance. Even though feeling morally 
obliged to help Somalis in such critical moments as the humanitarian crisis in the Horn 
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of Africa, Abshir does not consider himself to be in the position to engage in long-
lasting financial commitments, at least at the time of conducting the interview. His 
comment on the said subject matter is rather concise and straightforward: “I  am  too  
young for that”.  
Contrary to the aforementioned young Somali man, Leylo elaborates on 
the logic of her own financial decisions to support her relatives in Somalia. She 
constructs her argument on the premise of contrasting her own way of thinking with that 
of the younger generation of Somalis who were born in Finland: 
 
- In your understanding, is the second generation of Somalis living in Finland 
interested in supporting their relatives in Somalia? 
-  It  depends  on  where  they  were  born.  If  they  were  born  here,  it  means  that  they  
have changed compared to older Somalis. If they have lived here all their lives and 
they have never seen how it is in Somalia. They can see their mothers and fathers 
supporting the family, but they are a little bit different, you know?  They have a 
different thinking. 
- In what way is their thinking different? 
- For example, they have this thinking that this is ‘my money’ and I am gonna do 
whatever I want to with them. They think, “I need this money here, not to send it 
there”.  But  I  think,  “Ok I  have five euro,  this  is  enough for  me to eat,  I  can send 
fifty euro to my sister or my mother, or other family members. They will be able to 
buy food on this money”. And I am working. These kids think, “This is my money 
and  I  want  to  buy  shoes  on  it”.  I  would  think,  “Fifty  Euro?  No  way!  How many  
people can live there on this money? One month or two month, on this fifty euro? I 
would rather  wait  until  20 per  cent  or  30 per  cent  sale  to  buy those shoes”.  Their  
thinking is different.  
- In your opinion, the fact that they never were to Somalia plays a role here? 
- Yes, they have never had difficulties in their lives, they always have food, housing. 
They never experienced it. It’s difficult for them to understand (Leylo, 2012).  
 
As  one  can  see  from  the  detailed  account  of  Leylo’s  spending  and  
consumption decisions, she repeatedly examines the life she lives in Finland against that 
of  her  close  family  and  relatives  whom  she  left  in  Somalia.  Although  possessing  a  
regular source of income from full-time employment as a highly qualified medical 
professional, she cannot grow used to the spending habits of younger Somalis, who 
have an innate desire to behave and spend as much as their Finnish peers. The thoughts 
and concerns about her relatives in Somalia govern to a large extent both her spending 
patterns in Finland and remittances to Somalia. She believes that different generations 
of Somalis living in Finland exhibit surprisingly different mindsets. Viewed from 
Leylo’s point of view, these different modes of thinking manifest themselves in 
perceptions about who owns  the  money.  While  the  second  generation  of  Somalis  see  
money it terms of “my own” resources, the first generation, which she considers herself 
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belonging  to,  conversely,  see  it  rather  as  “family  or  community  money”.  This  
“community money” does not automatically and indisputably belong to the person who 
earns it.  
Another interviewee of mine, who does not send remittances on a regular 
basis, declared that he wished to avoid being associated with the Somali diaspora. Seen 
in  the  light  of  this  statement,  being  part  of  the  Somali  diaspora  entails  being  part  of  a  
problem, which Garaad would like to avoid by means of divorcing himself from the 
cross-border ethnic social networks. 
 
I came here a long time ago, so I don’t feel like I belong to the diaspora. Somalis in 
general do not have a good reputation here. When Finnish people see Somalis 
whom they don’t know, they usually tend to think of them in negative terms. 
(Garaad, 2011).  
 
 
The informant adds that even though he used to have extensive 
connections with other Somalis living in the diaspora, with time, he grew “too lazy” to 
maintain those long-distance contacts. Garaad expressively describes how, as time 
passed, he learned to accept Finland as his new homeland.  As an explanation for his 
non-engagement in transnational activities and the disidentification with diaspora affairs 
he  offers  the  argument  that,  while  acknowledging  the  traditional  norm  for  Somalis  to  
support  each  other,  he  does  not  feel  the  same  way  in  view  of  the  fact  that  he  was  
separated from his family as a child. For this reason, traditional family values and the 
moral guideline of being supportive to others were not instilled in him from birth.   
 
It’s  normal  for  Somali  people  to  support  their  relatives  or  clan  members.  Clan  is  
like a family, but in larger sense. You can also support your friends, even though 
they are from a different clan. I don’t support anyone in particular systematically. 
If someone needs help, of course I will support that person. But it’s only my 
personal  case.  Many  Somalis  feel  that  they  are  responsible  for  helping  other  
Somalis in need. I didn’t grow up in my family so I don’t stay in touch with them 
and I don’t support them (Garaad, 2011). 
 
In the formulation of Al-Sharmani (2010), the socialization and education 
of young Somalis in an environment in which family obligations are seen as having 
paramount  value  are  regarded  by  some of  the  Somali  woman as  a  guarantee  that  their  
children will, in the long run, become reliable ‘sources’ of social capital and ensure the 
reproduction of transnational support systems. Children who regularly attend 
59 
 
 
 
community gatherings and listen to the elders preaching about the importance of being 
committed to one’s family and the wider community are more likely to feel obliged to 
send remittances if they decide to move to a different country. Teaching Qur’an to the 
children and bringing them up in observance of religious norms and values, apart from 
helping  them  to  become  obedient  Muslims,  is  thought  to  be  an  effective  strategy  to  
evoke children’s sensitiveness to the demands of a given family or the community  
(Ibid).  Judging by this argument, Garaad’s account may be interpreted in terms of a 
lack of the ‘proper’ traditional Somali family experience, which precluded him from 
becoming a regular and committed remitter. 
A further Somali in my study explained his disinterest in transnational 
economic affairs that emerged as a result of his preoccupation with his own life projects, 
a major force that kept him socializing with the diaspora and fulfilling his moral duties 
to engage in long-lasting support relationships with his relatives in Somalia: 
 
 I have to say that I have very good friends. But because of my work and my 
projects  I  never  had  time  to  be  social,  to  hang  out  with  other  Somalis.  I  was  just  
with  those  close  friends.  I  need  to  have  my  own  space.  So  it  kept  me  from  
socializing with other Somalis (Boqol, 2012). 
 
Based on the foregoing accounts, investment in social networks by means 
of remittances does not present itself as self-obvious in spite of the common awareness 
of the adverse situations, which some of the Somali relatives or kin members may 
encounter. Since there is a lack of commitment to transnational support mechanisms on 
their part, social ties to some Somalis in Finland cannot be counted as ‘mobilisable’. 
The categorization of social ties which constitute the multi-level transnational social 
networks keeps the concept of social capital within its semantic boundaries. 
Consequently, if social ties are not ‘mobilisable’ they can hardly be thought of as 
playing any part in the process of capital transformation and social capital reproduction. 
Nonetheless, it is equally important to consider the reasons behind non-engagement and 
the lack of so-called transnational capabilities due to the fact that the said phenomena 
represent a distinct and context-bound facet of the social relations that underlie 
remittance practices. 
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3.7. Articulations of Negative Social Capital 
“They told me, “Didn’t you know? ‘Contact me’ means ‘send me money’”  
The broad identification of the possible negative consequences of social capital, as 
presented by Portes (1998), does not, in my understanding, necessarily apply to every 
tightly-knit community and may depend on a variety of cultural and socio-structural 
factors. Even though one can find at least four unfavourable consequences of social 
capital in the relevant literature, only two of them, however, were touched upon in the 
conducted interviews. As it is not my aim to duplicate the content of the subchapter 
discussing the theoretical framework, I briefly recap the above considerations by stating 
that the exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group members, restrictions on 
individual freedoms, and downward levelling norms are believed to be the main 
limitations of social capital. My informants recognized the first two limitations of social 
capital but left the remainder, namely the restrictions on individual freedoms and 
downward levelling norms, unmentioned. 
The negative factor of excluding outsiders was mentioned predominantly 
in reference to the excluding and discriminative nature of clan divisions, which are 
believed to impinge on the community cohesion in Somali diaspora. The discourse 
about the exclusive characteristics of clanship was, generally triggered by my invitation 
to share the opinion of my interviewees on the relevance of clan system in the context of 
the contemporary Finnish society. Leylo, who herself belongs to the first generation of 
Somali refugees, thinks that, albeit not relevant in the Finnish context, some people still 
do attend to the clan hierarchy: 
 
- Could you, please, explain what Somali clan system means to you and your 
relatives? 
- It is not important, but people are still using it.  
- How do they use it? 
- Discriminating on the basis of clan. People who didn’t integrate use it. They are 
only living within their own community and clan system. But I think that someone 
who is educated doesn’t need it. Sometimes it shows, sometimes it doesn’t. I don’t 
care, but people have to know where they come from and which clan they belong 
to. That is important.  
- Why do you think that it is important? 
- For them, for those people who don’t have a local network this is the only network 
that they have (Leylo, 2012).   
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Interestingly, she points out that the discriminatory and exclusive 
restrictions of clanship are binding only for those Somalis who have experienced 
problems with integration. Accordingly, she stresses the internal diversity of the Somali 
diaspora, a recurring theme in the interviews. Leylo argues that clan network is the only 
available social structure for un-integrated Somalis, who, faced with societal isolation in 
the country of immigration, find acceptance and understanding in their own clan circles. 
According to Griffiths (1997, p. 5), clanship has been labelled in the anthropological 
literature as “the primordial basis of the Somali imagined identity” and is believed to be 
immune  to  changes  in  Somalia  as  well  as  in  any  of  the  countries  in  which  Somali  
diaspora resides. While clan membership is presumed to provide access to unlimited 
support and resources, it also represents a symbolic boundary that keeps the outsiders 
out. Maryan Abdulkarim, one of the expert interviewees in this thesis who works as an 
expert in multicultural issues at Väestöliitto, is of the opinion that a person can be 
refused much needed help on the grounds of clan discrimination: 
 
- Why, in your opinion, clans are often viewed negatively? 
- Because clanship influences how you observe things. You judge other people. You 
might be refused if you need help only because you stem from a different clan 
(Maryan, 2012). 
 
Another negative side of social capital, more specifically, excess claims on 
group members, was described by Aasiya, a young Somali woman who regularly sends 
remittances  to  her  relatives  in  Somalia,  in  terms  of  excess  claims  on  her  personal  
income: 
 
- They think that if you are abroad, you are a rich person, you have loads of money. 
It’s all about money. 
- When you speak with your relatives on the phone, do they ask you for money? 
- Yes,  they  ask  for  money  right  away.  Once,  when  I  was  still  new here  in  Finland  
and  I  called  home,  at  the  end  of  the  call  they  said,  “Contact  me!”  I  didn’t  quite  
understand what they meant by this “contact me” and asked them to explain it to 
me. They told me, “Don’t you know? ‘Contact me’ means ‘send me money’” 
(Aasiya, 2011). 
 
 
Family obligations that represent a source of great pressure on the lives of 
Somali refugees have been quite extensively addressed in the literature on refugee 
remittances (e.g., Hammond 2011, Lindley 2010, Horst 2004). Even those of my 
interlocutors who claim to be committed to supporting their families expressed concerns 
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that their relatives do not quite understand how hard it is to make one’s living as a 
refugee and to have dependents in Somalia who are relying solely on the regular flow of 
remittances from abroad. As briefly mentioned by Assiya, some family members 
develop particular strategies and a symbolic language to communicate their needs to the 
remitters. In the case of her relatives “contact me” signifies an explicit request to send 
funds at her earliest convenience. Due to the scale and the long history of remittances as 
the primary means of subsistence for Somali families, it might be that some Somalis 
adopt a specific symbolically loaded terminology to effectively communicate their 
financial hardships, with the message embedded in the “contact me” phrase being only 
one of many.  
As maintained by Hammond (2011), the rules and social roles that go with 
the family obligations of refugee remitters are still relatively under-researched. I believe 
that the conceptualisation of excessive claims on group members in terms of negative 
social  capital  may  prove  to  be  a  useful  analytical  toolkit  that  leads  to  a  better  
understanding of this phenomenon.  
As corroborated by the empirical evidence above, negative social capital 
may both considerably affect the experiences of remittance senders and define the social 
relations behind the transnational economic activities of the diaspora. On the whole, it 
should be recognized that the positive and negative consequences of social capital are 
its intrinsic qualities and cannot be separated from each other. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
4.1. Concluding discussion 
 
The primary research question of this thesis was to explore the social relations behind 
the remittance practices of Somalis living in and around the Helsinki metropolitan area. 
The theory of social capital, as originally suggested by Bourdieu (1986), was employed 
in order to investigate how the economic behaviour of Somalis is embedded in 
transnational social networks. Because social capital reproduction is believed to stem 
from the exchangeability of different forms of capital, namely economic, social, and 
cultural capital, I attempted to show in my study how Somali informants reproduce 
social capital through the act of sending remittances to Somalia. In Chapter 1, I 
revisited the above-mentioned theory and tried to adjust it to the realities of the issues 
under scrutiny by adding ethnicity and gender to social class, both of which constitute 
the main factors that lie at the core of the capital reproduction cycle. Additionally, I 
suggested  that  some  Somali  women  who  either  come  to  Finland  as  refugees  or  enter  
through family reunification programme may benefit from the relative shifts in cultural 
capital accumulation by virtue of the equal access to education and professional training.  
The topic of transnational remittances was approached from the diaspora 
perspective in order to tap into the complexity of social relations that affect remittance 
practices. In Chapter 2, I described briefly the Somali community living in Finland and 
suggested that the diasporic consciousness that is fixed in the experience of forced 
migration  and  dispersion  may,  to  a  certain  extent,  influence  transnational  diasporic  
activities, including remittances. The Hawala money transfer agency proved to be a 
highly contested topic surrounded by the politicized discourse about formality versus 
informality and legality versus illegality. Next, I explored the notions of negative capital 
and  mobilisability  of  social  ties  with  the  aim to  apply  it  to  the  empirical  analysis  that  
followed in Chapter 3.    
The findings of my qualitative inquiry have been a continuous source of 
inspiration  to  me  as  they  revealed  a  diverse  array  of  meanings  that  Somalis  attach  to  
remittance practices. The practical motivations to remit can range from family and kin 
obligations, moral allegiance to the nation of Somalia as a whole, to politically-laden 
considerations. The findings showed that the individual perceptions of hawala 
remittance agency constitute a counter-narrative about its legality and its perceived 
superiority to other means of transferring money. The informants in my study reiterated 
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on many occasions the reliability of the agency and its status as an officially registered 
organization in Finland, which was accompanied by somewhat emotional claims that 
the said institution is a diligent taxpayer. The concepts of trust and clanship that 
frequently emerged in the interviews seem to be tightly coupled. It is for that reason that 
it  has  been  at  times  challenging  to  discern  whether  it  is  an  issue  of  trust  or  clan  
affiliation,  or  maybe  both,  that  justifies  the  subjective  reliability  of  hawala  agency.  
Further research in this field could shed more light on the interplay of trust, clanship, 
and the counter-narrative about the legality of hawala operations. Notwithstanding this 
obvious ambiguity, I advocate in favour of thinking about the hawala agency as a 
network of trust and a manifestation of the social capital contained in transnational 
networks of hawala agents and their customers. 
Furthermore, the phenomenon of clanship, which continues to be viewed 
upon  as  playing  a  decisive  role  in  the  everyday  life  of  Somali  diaspora,  can  act  as  a  
divisive force that shapes the highly fragmented nature of the Somali community. As 
some of my informants hold back from associating themselves with clanship, it appears 
that clan networks have evolved into an elusive construction that some, but not all, 
Somalis chose to rely on. Diversity within the seemingly heterogeneous diaspora, 
including the highly divergent views of its members on the causes and meaning of the 
conflict in Somalia, materializes itself in the conflicting interests of decision-takers in 
Somalia. Individual and community remittances are, therefore, regarded by some of my 
informants as politically-laden transactions that reflect the aforementioned interests. As 
all of my interviewees wish to see Somali diaspora united rather than fragmented, the 
ever existing clan-based political divisions were often referred to as a source of strong 
personal discontent. In order to balance the negative views regarding the politicized 
nature of the transnational economic activities of the diaspora, I drew particular 
attention to the positive accounts of remittances as catalysts of the increasing economic 
wellbeing and, in the long run, the political stability of the Somali state. By means of 
illustration, the housing projects carried out by Somali diaspora in the comparatively 
peaceful areas of Somalia were articulated by my informants as a positive sign and 
commitment of diaspora people to their homeland.  
Due to the fact that, from my viewpoint, remittance behaviour is crucial to 
the understanding of how transformation of different types of capital occurs, I attempted 
to investigate what is the possible rationale for remitters to engage in transnational 
economic activities. Tellingly, family values and sensitiveness towards the needs of 
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one’s family act as an important source of social capital in Somali diaspora, which, in 
consequence, shapes remittance patterns. The bounded solidarity that expresses itself in 
the collective identity of Somalis is yet another critical factor. Even though instrumental 
motives, such as expected reciprocity, were alluded to by only one of my informants, by 
and large, the collected interview material indicates that the altruistic motives for 
remitting constitute the main source of social capital.  
A somewhat unexpected finding was the perceived gendered nature of 
remittance practices. The conjecture that Somali women are seen as better remitters than 
Somali men constitutes a further personal discovery of mine that echoes with the results 
of other studies on Somali  remittances.  The discourse about women as active actors in 
transnational support systems seems to be quite widespread in the diaspora circles. 
While,  according  to  available  statistics,  men  prevail  in  remittances  to  Somalia,  the  
perceived ‘feminization’ of remittances appears to occur in relative rather than absolute 
terms. The growing participation of women in remittances suggests a gradual but 
decisive change of the ‘minority’ status of women in the traditional Somali society. 
Indisputably,  social  capital  is  a  multifaceted  notion.  With  the  purpose  of  
revealing the negative consequences of social capital, the possible unfavourable aspects 
of social capital as well as the concept of mobilisability of social ties were incorporated 
into the research design. Negative social capital in Somali diaspora was verbalized in 
terms of exclusion of the outsiders and excess claims on group members, which 
combined constitute two out of four markers of the negative social capital that were 
pinpointed in the theoretical part of this thesis. The exclusionary and discriminatory 
nature of clanship is considered to be a negative force that fuels conflicts and facilitates 
the internal fragmentation of diaspora.  However,  as put by one of my discussants,  it  is  
the badly integrated Somalis who wish to see the clan network as a social space with 
distinct boundaries that the outsiders are not allowed to cross. Excessive claims on 
group members, understood in terms of claims on the money of Somalis living in 
Western  countries,  turned  to  be  an  additional  point  in  the  discourse.  Some informants  
experience constant demands on the part of their relatives to send money, which is 
almost unanimously viewed as a source of major pressure. A seemingly popular belief 
that, after having moved to the West, one, by default, turns into a rich person was 
mentioned as the prime cause of the unjustifiable excessive claims on one’s income.   
The exploration of the topic of transnational capabilities or, in other words, 
the argument of the (un)willingness to engage in transnational economic activities, 
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confirmed my belief that conceiving of social capital as a universal source of benefits 
might lead to the oversimplification of truly complex social relations. Moreover, it may 
deprive the concept of social capital of its analytical power. Generation differences were 
mentioned as a strong determinant of transnational capabilities. One of the participants 
of this study, a female in her mid thirties who belongs to the first generation of Somalis 
residing in Finland, mentioned that money might convey different meaning for older 
and  younger  Somalis.  She  sees  the  money that  she  earns  as  not  fully  belonging  to  her  
but rather as a common property of her transnational family. The younger generation of 
Somalis, on the other hand, are believed to have developed a contrasting attitude 
towards money. Even the unearned pocket money that is given by their parents is seen 
in  terms  of  ‘my  own  resources’.  Both  the  closeness  to  the  family  and  the  
(dis)identification with Somali diaspora seem to constitute yet another two factors that 
shape the transnational capabilities of my interviewees. The subjective feeling that 
being part of the Somali diaspora entails being a party to numerous problems seems to 
trigger  the  emotional  response  of  non-engagement  in  diasporic  affairs.  This  section  is  
concluded with the claim that, perhaps, only the ‘mobilisable’ social ties can be enacted 
in the process of social capital reproduction through remittances. 
It should be additionally noted that the findings of the study cannot be 
generalized to the wider Somali community in Finland or, by extension, to the global 
Somali diaspora due to the relative scarcity of the interview material, which is 
comprised of only ten semi-structured interviews, two of which were conducted with 
experts. Notwithstanding the shortcomings, the findings constitute a valuable insight 
into the individual experiences regarding the social relations behind remittance practices.  
To conclude, I attempt to identify the possible implications that this study 
holds for future research in this area. It has to be borne in mind that a number of 
questions on the sidelines of this thesis have been left unanswered, for example: What is 
the nature of the relationship between trust and clanship in the discourse about hawala 
remittance agency? In what ways are the altruistic/ instrumental remittance motives 
embedded in the local context of the country of immigration? What are other possible 
altruistic and instrumental reasons for remitting apart from those already mentioned? 
Can negative capital be conceived of as driving ‘forced transnationalism’ and what 
particular effect does it have on the wellbeing of remitters? 
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4.2. Future theoretical implications 
 
Having finished the empirical part of this thesis, I started contemplating the implications 
that my findings could possibly hold for the further development of the theory of social 
capital and refugee remittances per se.  In view of the aforesaid deliberations,  firstly,  I  
suggest paying more attention to gender and ethnicity as indispensable factors in social 
capital reproduction. Gender, ethnicity, and class are all believed to be the main 
determinants of the symbolic and material stratification of a given society (Anthias, 
2001). They affect the way how resources are distributed in societal structures. 
Additionally, the social relations that surround these aspects shape people’s identities 
and attitudes (Ibid.). If added to the conceptualization of social capital reproduction, the 
above-mentioned elements of social stratification could help us understand a great deal 
of social relations that relate to remittances, as opposed to the situation in which only 
social class is taken into the account. 
A further issue that warrants consideration is the nature of differences 
between refugee and labour migrant remittances. As suggested by Lindley (2007), the 
patterns of remittances sent by refugee and labour migrants vary to a large extent. It is 
commonly assumed that the main markers of refugee remittances include, among others, 
the existence of an external trigger that compels one to start remitting, the varying 
geography of remittances, and the stability of remittance flows that persists at times of 
economic crises (ibid). As suggested in Chapter 2,  it  might also be a certain diasporic 
consciousness, or even double consciousness (Dayal,  1996),  that  is,  the  orientation  of  
diaspora towards both the country of immigration and the country or origin, that makes 
the difference. The common experiences of adversities before and after forced migration 
seem to lend more meaning to the joint community activities that are directed towards 
the homeland, remittances being a case in point. However, in my judgement, this 
explanation is far from being a complete account of the distinction between the two 
categories. Therefore, further analytical fine-tuning of the boundary between refugee 
and labour remittances is much required.  
Apart  from  the  need  for  a  clearer  differentiation  between  refugee  and  
labour remittances, gendering remittances may constitute a further subject matter worth 
exploring. As claimed by Vullnetari and King (2011, p. 39), remittances and the ‘gender 
question’ have rarely been researched in conjunction with each other. It is therefore 
argued in this study that taking into the consideration the gendered power relations in 
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both the countries of immigration and at the origin as well as expanding the notion of 
remittances to account for social and technological remittances could serve the purpose 
of developing the academic body of knowledge about the remittances-gender nexus 
(Ibid.).  
With regard to the methodological considerations, further exploration of 
the qualitative toolkit pertaining to the research on social capital is needed. While, in 
this thesis, I employed the method of semi-structured interviews as the primary medium 
for investigating the articulations of social capital reproduction through remittances, 
other methodological tools, such as, for instance, multi-cited fieldwork, could be 
brought into the play so as to better understand the patterns of remittances. If the study 
was designed to take place in more than one location, the findings might have revealed 
some other features of social relations underlining remittances, which have not been 
discussed in this thesis.  
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APPENDIX I: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE 
1. Regular interview guide 
Main questions Additional questions 
Background information 
 
Education and occupation. 
 
When did you first come to Finland? 
 
In what status? (asylum seeker/family 
reunification programme) 
 
 
 
How old were you when you entered 
Finland? 
 
From which part of Somalia are you 
originally? 
Contextual factors 
 
Can you please describe your life in Finland? 
 
How did adaptation to the new life in Finland 
go for you?  
 
What did you experience as particularly 
difficult/easy? 
 
 
 
When you were/are experiencing 
difficulties here in Finland, whom 
did/do you turn to for support and 
advice? 
Diaspora 
 
Please describe your relationships with other 
Somalis living in Finland? 
 
Do you travel to Somalia often? 
  
Are you a member of any Somali 
association(s) or NGO(s)? 
 
Could you, please, explain what clan system 
means to you/your relatives, acquaintances? 
 
How important is it for you to keep in touch 
with your relatives and friends living in 
Somalia as well as in other countries? 
 
Would you consider coming back to Somalia, 
in case the situation there improves? 
 
 
 
How did you get to know your Somali-
Finnish friends?  
 
Do you miss your previous life in 
Somalia? 
 
How would you describe your status in 
the Somali diaspora? 
 
What are your responsibilities in your 
capacity of ___ in this 
NGO/association? 
 
Is, in your opinion, clan system relevant 
in the realities of the Finnish society? 
 
Could you please describe the position 
of women in Somali community? 
 
Remittances 
 
Do you send remittances to Somalia? 
 
 
 
Why do you trust hawala money 
transfer agency? Could you, please, 
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How do you decide when and whom you 
send money to? 
 
When you send remittances to Somalia, the 
services of what money transfer agency do 
you use? 
 
How would you describe hawala agency, 
particularly, how hawala agents execute 
money transfers? 
 
give me some examples?  
 
In what situation clan divisions in 
Somali diaspora can affect the way how 
people send remittances? 
Social capital 
 
What does the support of your 
relatives/friends mean to you? 
 
What would be your reaction if you learn that 
someone (a Somali) needs help/financial 
support? 
 
What role does trust mean in your life? 
 
Why do you send remittances to Somalia? 
 
What would you do if someone who you 
know from Somalia suddenly calls and asks 
to urgently send money? 
 
Are there any downsides of being a supporter 
of your family? 
 
 
 
If you are a member of a clan network 
what does it entail in terms of possible 
benefits? 
 
If you do not remit money yourself, are 
you aware of any difficulties that your 
friends/relatives are perhaps 
experiencing with their role of a 
provider for the family? 
Conclusion of an interview 
 
Would you like to add anything else to what 
we have discussed already? 
 
 
Is there perhaps anything important left 
that I haven’t asked? 
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2. Expert interview guide 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions 
- What is the area of your responsibilities as an expert in multicultural affairs? 
- Where, in your opinion, do most difficulties with Somali refugees’ adjustment to 
the life in Finland lie? 
- What role do remittances play in lives of Somalis living in Finland? 
- Why, in your opinion, do Somalis engage in long-lasting relationships of support 
and dependency with their relatives and kin members? 
- How do you see these support-relationships affecting both parties (a sender and 
a receiver of remittances)? 
- How would you describe the relationship between gender and remittances? 
- Do you agree with the opinion that remittances is like a glue that holds Somali 
families together? If yes/no, than why? 
- How, in your opinion, are gender relations changing in the Somali community? 
- Would you describe the Somali diaspora in Finland as united or, rather, 
fragmented, and why? 
- What is your general opinion about Somali associations and NGOs based in 
Finland?  Are  they  always  willing  to  cooperate  with  one  another?  Is  there  an  
umbrella organization that coordinates their activities? 
- How does Somali clan membership, in your knowledge, affect one’s decisions? 
- Does clan network still hold any value for Somalis living in Finland? 
- Do you think that clan networks of Somalis living in Finland can be considered 
as a source of social capital? 
- Is there anything else that you would like to add to our discussion? 
